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T O M  D A N N E N B A U M  
Why Have We Criminalized Aggressive War? 
abstract . On the dominant view, accepted by both defenders and critics of the criminaliza-
tion of aggression, the criminal wrong of aggressive war is inﬂicted on the attacked state. This 
view is mistaken. It is true that whether a war is criminally aggressive is determined ordinarily by 
whether it involves a particular form of interstate wrong. However, that is not why such wars are 
criminal. Aggressive war is a crime because it entails killing without justiﬁcation. Five reasons 
explain why this is so. First, banning aggression restricted states from using force to protect their 
core sovereign rights, including even their rights of political independence and territorial integri-
ty. Those core states’ rights cannot make sense of the move to ban aggression. Second, what dis-
tinguishes aggression from any other sovereignty violation—what makes it criminal, when no 
other sovereignty violation is—is not that it involves an especially egregious violation of territori-
al integrity or political independence, but that it involves killing without justiﬁcation. Third, the 
unjustiﬁed killing account makes sense of aggression’s standing alongside genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity. The traditional notion that aggression is a crime against sovereign-
ty instead isolates aggression as the inexplicably odd crime out. Fourth, the public reasons for 
restricting jus ad bellum rights in the early twentieth century focused not on infringements of 
states’ rights but on the inﬂiction of death without justiﬁcation. Finally, the importance of 
wrongful killing to the criminalization of aggression was apparent at the post-World War II tri-
bunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Understanding the crime in this way matters doctrinally. This 
understanding clariﬁes the boundaries of the crime, resolving hard cases like unilateral humani-
tarian intervention and bloodless invasion. It also has implications for the legal rights of soldiers 
involved on either side of such wars. 
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introduction 
Nearly seventy years have passed since an international tribunal has con-
victed a defendant of the crime of aggressive war. Nonetheless, beginning this 
year, aggression is likely to join the list of violations over which the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction.
1
 To understand the implications 
of this development, and to grasp the controversies surrounding it, we need to 
be clear about what is criminally wrongful about aggressive war. This Article 
investigates that question.
 
Like most elements of international criminal law, aggression ﬁnds its foun-
dation in the statutes and jurisprudence of the post-World War II tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo.
2
 However, it is an anomalous crime in several respects. 
The statutes of every post-Cold War international and hybrid criminal tribunal 
other than the ICC have ignored aggression, even as the General Assembly has 
repeatedly endorsed its status as an international crime.
3
 This marginalization 
 
1. Assembly of States Parties, Res. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter ICC Aggression 
Amendments], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4AX5-JPK6]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 bis, 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (last amended November 29, 2010, depository notiﬁcation 
C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The necessary thirty states’ ratiﬁ-
cations, id. art. 15 bis (2), have now been reached, Status of Ratiﬁcation and Implementation, 
GLOB. CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION & IMPLEMENTATION KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON CRIME 
AGGRESSION (June 26, 2016), http://crimeofaggression.info/the-role-of-states/status-of 
-ratiﬁcation-and-implementation [http://perma.cc/KWN3-ESZH]. 
2. See, e.g., Charter of the International Tribunal for the Far East art. 5(a), Jan. 19, 1946, 1589 
T.I.A.S. 21 [hereinafter IMFTE Statute]; Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 
6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]; Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945), in 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 
50, art. II(1)(a) (1946) [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10]. For court decisions and 
proceedings accepting these innovative provisions as valid law, see Judgment, in 22 TRIAL OF 
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 411, 461-66, 
524-26, 528-32, 533-34, 539-40, 544-45, 550-51, 556-57, 561-62, 568-69, 574-76, 580-82 (1948) 
[hereinafter IMT Judgment]; International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment of 12 
November 1948, in 20 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 48,413, 48,437-41 (R. John Pritchard & 
Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981) [hereinafter IMTFE Judgment]; and Judgment, in 14 TRI-
ALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 385-89, 399-416, 418-35 (1949) [hereinafter Ministries Case]. 
    On the landmark status of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in establishing the crime, 
see, for example, R v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16, [1], [2007] 1 AC 136 (appeal taken from 
Eng.); and WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 555 (1954). 
3. On its General Assembly endorsement, see G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex art. 5(2), Deﬁni-
tion of Aggression (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter UNGA Deﬁnition of Aggression]; and G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
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stands in stark contrast to the central focus placed on war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide in those tribunals. Even aggression’s initial 
codiﬁcation in the Rome Statute in 1998 was extraordinary. Despite being in-
cluded as one of the four categories of crime, aggression was a placeholder be-
reft of content; the Statute required a subsequent deﬁnitional amendment be-
fore it would come into effect.
4
 
The scope of criminal responsibility for aggression is also unique. At Nu-
remberg and Tokyo, the tribunals held that soldierly obedience was no excuse 
for participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity.
5
 In the case of ag-
gression, however, they restricted criminal liability exclusively to members of 
the German and Japanese leadership cabals.
6
 The ICC amendment makes this 
leadership element explicit and buttresses it with a provision speciﬁc to aggres-
sion that narrows signiﬁcantly the complicity doctrines on which almost every 
post-Cold War international conviction has hinged.
7
 
Finally, and most signiﬁcantly, aggression is widely understood to be root-
ed in a moral wrong “committed against a state” rather than in wrongs “against 
 
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]. Before the Rome Statute, the 
crime of aggression was part of the International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 
Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter ILC, Draft Code of Crimes]. It 
ﬁnds no mention in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, or the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
4. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5(1)(d), 5(2). 
5. On the duty to disobey, see infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 2, art. II(2) (applying the crime of aggres-
sion only to those who held “high political, civil or military (including General Staff ) posi-
tion in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in 
the ﬁnancial, industrial or economic life of any such country”); United States v. Krauch, 
Military Tribunal VI, in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1126 (1949) [hereinafter I.G. Farben 
Case]; United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 462, 488-
90 (1949) [hereinafter High Command Case]; IMTFE Judgment, supra note 2, at 49,827. 
7. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8 bis (1), 25 bis (3); see sources cited infra note 264 (discuss-
ing the “moral equality” doctrine for combatants). The notion that aggression is a “leader-
ship crime” is often considered obvious, and it generated no debate in the ICC’s amendment 
process. The United States’ chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, later said, “It 
never occurred to me, and I am sure it occurred to no one else at the conference table, to 
speak of anyone as ‘waging’ a war except topmost leaders . . . .” Robert H. Jackson, The 
United Nations Organization and War Crimes (April 26, 1952), 46 PROC..ANN. MEETING (AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L.) 196, 198 (1952). 
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individuals.”
8
 In an open letter urging States Parties not to proceed with the in-
corporation of aggression, a coalition of pro-ICC human rights activists 
stressed precisely this normative contrast between the state-focused crime of 
aggression and the human-focused crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.
9
 The distinction is arguably implicit in every relevant inter-
national criminal law provision, from Nuremberg and Tokyo to the ICC 
amendment.
10
 
The most inﬂuential moral accounts of the crime of aggression also under-
stand the wrong of aggression in these terms. For Michael Walzer and others 
defending its criminal wrongfulness, aggression is fundamentally a crime 
against the political collective, rooted in a “domestic analogy” in which states 
“possess rights more or less as individuals do.”
11
 Critics of the criminalization 
of aggression adopt the same understanding of the internal normative posture 
of the law, but object to its classiﬁcation alongside the other international 
crimes precisely because it privileges sovereignty over humanity.
12
 For them, 
this feature of aggression contradicts what they take to be the deﬁning moral 
thrust of international criminal law. Walzer and these critics disagree on 
whether the sovereignty violation that occurs in an aggressive war is a moral 
wrong worthy of criminalization. However, from the internal legal point of 
view, they agree that the crime as currently constituted is rooted in that claimed 
wrong. 
Other international crimes, like genocide, also involve wrongs against a col-
lective entity, but what is special about the putative wrong underpinning the 
crime of aggression on both of these competing views is that it occurs exclusive-
ly on the macro level. No one would deny that the individual men and boys 
 
8. Letter from Aryeh Neier, President, Open Soc’y Inst. et al. to Foreign Ministers, Regarding 
Aggression and the International Criminal Court (May 10, 2010), http://www.opensocie 
tyfoundations.org/sites/default/ﬁles/icc-aggression-letter-20100511.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G9GX-2FSX]. 
9. Id.; see also International Criminal Court: Amnesty International’s Call for Pledges by States  
at the
 
13th Session of the Assembly of States Parties, AMNESTY INT’L 5, n.18 (Oct. 29,  
2014) [hereinafter International Criminal Court], http://www.amnesty.org/download/Doc
uments/8000/ior530102014en.pdf [http://perma.cc/PW47-HZGA] (“Although [Amnesty 
International] recognizes that an act of aggression by one state against another can lead to 
serious human rights abuses in international armed conﬂicts, it does not take a position on 
whether conﬂicts themselves should be determined to be just or legal or whether leaders 
suspected of committing the speciﬁc crime of aggression—a crime by one state against an-
other state—should be prosecuted.”). 
10. See infra Section II.A. 
11. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 58 (1977); see infra Section II.A. 
12. See infra Section II.B. 
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killed at Srebrenica were the victims of genocide, even though it was also a 
crime against Bosnian Muslims as a group.
13
 In contrast, individual soldiers 
killed while ﬁghting their states’ lawful wars against aggression are generally 
not thought to be victims of a crime.
14
 Or so the traditional normative account 
goes. 
This Article rejects that understanding. Not only are individuals, including 
soldiers, wronged gravely in an aggressive war, the wrongfulness of their 
treatment as individuals is the very crux of what explains the criminalization of 
aggression. It is the normative core of the crime. 
To be clear, the dominant view, shared by both defenders and critics of the 
criminalization of aggression, is correct in one respect: a war of aggression is an 
interstate breach and, typically, a violation of sovereignty. In other words, 
whether a war is criminal depends in large part on whether that interstate 
breach occurred. However, imputing personal criminal responsibility for an in-
terstate breach is anomalous; that violation is not why aggressive war is crimi-
nal. The core moral problem with aggressive war is neither that it infringes 
sovereignty, nor even the extent to which it infringes sovereignty. Indeed, in at 
least one circumstance, it need not infringe sovereignty at all.
15
 Rather, the core 
moral issue is that aggressive war entails killing and maiming for reasons that 
are now considered unacceptable: reasons other than the protection and securi-
ty of human life. 
This Article establishes and defends this internal normative account of the 
crime of aggression. Achieving normative clarity in this respect is not merely an 
academic or theoretical exercise. Coherent interpretation of the law requires 
understanding its moral underpinnings. Excavating and clarifying those foun-
dations can have profound doctrinal and structural effects. Understanding that 
 
13. See, e.g., Rb.-Den Haag 16 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8748 (Mothers of Srebeni-
ca/Netherlands) (Neth.), ¶ 4.179 (noting that the laws against genocide “partly serve to 
protect Claimants’ family members”); Victim Participation in Criminal Law Proceedings: Sur-
vey of Domestic Practice for Application to International Crimes Prosecutions, REDRESS & INST. 
FOR SECURITY STUD. 9 (Sept. 2015), http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Victim-Rights 
-Report-27-Aug-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y77R-5CX6] (arguing that crimes against hu-
manity, genocide, and often war crimes may be collective in one sense, but they also “directly 
attack the personality and individuality of victims, disrespecting their very ‘human exist-
ence’” (quoting CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 166 
(2012))). 
14. Consider, for example, the explicit exclusion of such individuals from the reparations calcu-
lations of the claims commissions following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Eritrean 
invasion of Ethiopia at either end of the 1990s. See infra notes 294-296 and accompanying 
text. 
15. See infra notes 132-144 and accompanying text. 
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the criminal wrong of aggressive war is its unjustiﬁed inﬂiction of death and 
human suffering has three material consequences. 
First, it clariﬁes how to interpret hard cases. Even if one accepts the domi-
nant view that humanitarian intervention without Security Council authoriza-
tion is illegal, the normative framework offered here weighs heavily against an 
interpretation on which such action would be criminal. By responding defen-
sively to the internationally criminal, massive inﬂiction of human harm, a 
genuine humanitarian intervention lacks the core wrong that makes aggressive 
war worthy of criminalization. Similarly, “bloodless” military invasions are best 
interpreted as noncriminal, despite their extremely effective and illegal usurpa-
tion of territory and political control. To be clear, this does not mean that such 
invasions cannot be countered lawfully by means such as defensive force and 
sanctions (unilateral or collective). Nor does it mean that the ensuing occupa-
tion is lawful or shielded from other legal remedies. It only means that such ac-
tions are best interpreted as falling below the demanding threshold of criminal-
ity. 
Second, normative coherence requires international law to take seriously 
the human rights and refugee claims of soldiers who refuse to ﬁght in aggres-
sive war. Some adherents to the traditional account see soldiers who ﬁght in 
criminal wars as contributory cogs, no more intimately involved than taxpayers 
in a macro wrong against a foreign state. This is a mistake; such soldiers perpe-
trate directly the constituent wrongs of the criminal action. There are good rea-
sons not to hold them criminally or civilly liable for their participation. Howev-
er, these are not reasons to deny them the right to refuse to ﬁght in such wars. 
On the contrary, the best interpretation of refugee and human rights law would 
affirm such a right. 
Third, recognizing that the core victims of the crime of aggression are indi-
viduals, rather than states, sheds light on how we ought to conceive of victim 
judicial participation and reparations in ICC aggression prosecutions. The 
crime of aggression is the core element of international criminal law that pro-
tects combatants’ and collateral civilians’ right to life. Unlike recent jus ad bel-
lum reparations regimes, which have excluded combatant deaths from the 
wrong warranting remedy, the ICC regime of reparations for aggression must 
reﬂect the normative centrality of precisely those personal violations. 
This Article provides the normative foundation for those doctrinal and op-
erational implications. Part I explains what it is to offer a normative account of 
a law and why it is appropriate here. Part II identiﬁes the dominant normative 
account of aggression, as understood by both advocates and critics of its crimi-
nalization. On this view, the core wrong of aggressive war is a wrong against 
the victim state and the political collective that it represents. Part III debunks 
that account, arguing that ﬁve aspects of aggression and its legal context show 
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that its criminalization is primarily about wrongful killing: (1) sovereignty is 
indeterminate as a normative guide to the jus ad bellum and it cannot explain 
why aggression is criminal, but more severe sovereignty violations are not; (2) 
its inﬂiction of unjustiﬁed human suffering can explain why illegal war is the 
only criminal sovereignty violation; (3) understanding aggression in this way 
reconciles it to the broader international criminal law project; (4) the claimed 
motivation for strengthening the jus ad bellum in the early- to mid-twentieth 
century was focused on human suffering, not states’ rights or sovereignty; and 
(5) the jurisprudence of Nuremberg and Tokyo affirms the place of unjustiﬁed 
killing at aggression’s normative core. Part IV addresses potential problems for 
this account posed by the legal status of bloodless aggression and humanitarian 
intervention. Part V introduces the key legal consequences of adopting this 
normative account. 
i .  the normative underpinnings of a crime 
Stated most abstractly, a “normative account” aims to elaborate a notion of 
wrongfulness that would make sense of and underpin the law’s posture on a 
given issue. The premise of engaging in work of this kind is that laws do not 
merely serve to coordinate or to set incentives; they also instantiate what the 
community in question takes to be important values. The balance between the 
coordinative and moral expressive functions varies across domains, but crimi-
nal law in particular takes a stand on what is right and wrong and on who has 
acted culpably. It does not provide priced permissions; it prohibits and it con-
demns.
16
 
This is nowhere clearer than in international criminal law. We cannot make 
sense of the criminalization of obedient participation in crimes against humani-
ty or genocide as a way of coordinating behavior.
17
 Confronting individuals 
with contradictory obligations under domestic and international law may even 
muddy coordination and confuse expectations. The criminalization of such 
 
16. This is manifest in particularly sharp form in the moral expressivism and moral education 
theories of punishment. See, e.g., R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 235-62 (1986); Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965); Jean Hampton, 
The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 (1984). For an ac-
count of expressive legal theory beyond the criminal law context, see Elizabeth S. Anderson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1503 (2000). 
17. On the duty to disobey, see sources cited infra note 150. 
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obedient participation is instead a moral expression of the wrongfulness of 
such participation and the culpability of those who engage in it.
18
 
The criminalization of aggression, like that of other behaviors, is an expres-
sion of fundamental moral values. At the core of the contemporary jus ad bellum 
is the public moral claim that certain kinds of war are fundamentally wrong-
ful.
19
 Signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928—the ﬁrst treaty to ban war 
explicitly—not only committed to “renounce” the recourse to war, but also to 
“condemn” it.
20
 This followed the unabashedly moralized framing of the issue 
by the Pact’s intellectual forefathers and was accompanied by claims that war 
had ﬁnally been recognized as a global public wrong, rather than a state of bi-
lateral dispute.
21
 
 
18. For arguments that this is the most viable normative account of the prosecution and pun-
ishment of such acts, see MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3, 61, 173-79 (2007); Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 
2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 117 (2002); Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing To Prosecute, 33 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 312 (2012); Ralph Henham, Some Issues for Sentencing in the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 81, 111 (2003); David Luban, Fairness to Right-
ness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 576 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); 
Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 
42 (2007); and Bill Wringe, Why Punish War Crimes?, 25 LAW & PHIL. 159, 160 (2006). Just 
as at Nuremberg, see infra notes 25-26, international prosecutors today continue to use 
heavily moralized language. David Crane, in his opening statement at the trial of Revolu-
tionary United Front leaders before the Special Court for Sierra Leone spoke of prosecuting 
leaders responsible for “horror, beyond the gothic into the realm of Dante’s inferno,” calling 
the defendants and their troops “evil.” Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT, 
Opening Statement of David M. Crane 2, 4 (July 5, 2004). The ICC relies on its “moral 
presence” to move states to arrest and prosecute most international criminals. Informal Ex-
pert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, OFFICE PROSECUTOR INT’L CRIM. CT. 
5, ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA (Mar. 30, 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres
/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf [http://perma.cc
/4BJ2-8NG5]. The Office of the Prosecutor understands the function of its own prosecutions 
in terms of moral expression, rather than deterrence or retribution. See id. One of the most 
prominent judicial voices in international criminal law, Antonio Cassese, used the regime’s 
“purpose” of punishing “morally reprehensible” behavior as an interpretive guide. Prosecu-
tor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 
¶ 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997). 
19. David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 161 (1980) (asserting 
that international law “expresses a theory of just war” and arguing that “to claim that inter-
national law is simply irrelevant to the theory of just war . . . is both implausible and ques-
tion-begging”). 
20. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 1, Aug. 27, 
1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. 
21. John Dewey wrote that the proposal would “concentrat[e] all the moral forces of the world 
against modern war, that abomination of abominations.” John Dewey, Foreword to SALMON 
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The asserted connection between the criminalization of aggression and un-
derlying moral values was even more explicit at Nuremberg. In his opening 
statement before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), 
chief prosecutor Justice Robert Jackson stressed, “When I say that we do not 
ask for convictions unless we prove crime, I do not mean mere technical or in-
cidental transgression of international conventions. We charge guilt on planned 
and intended conduct that involves moral as well as legal wrong.”
22
 He labeled 
the pre-Kellogg-Briand legal order “contrary to ethical principles” because it 
denied the maxim “that there are unjust wars and that unjust wars are illegal.”
23
 
The Tribunal itself went to some lengths to establish the positivist creden-
tials for outlawing aggressive war.
24
 However, it combined these efforts with 
deeply moralized claims. The IMT held that, even in the absence of an explicit 
criminal law prohibition, the leader of an aggressive war “must know that he is 
 
O. LEVINSON, OUTLAWRY OF WAR 7, 7 (1921). Col. Raymond Robins wrote of progress in the 
“moral code of mankind” and described a desire to have “militarists branded as super felons 
among the criminals of the earth.” Raymond Robins, Foreword to LEVINSON, supra, at 10, 10. 
Levinson himself described waging war as “the greatest of all wrongs” and “the most lawful 
‘crime’ in the world.” LEVINSON, supra, at 14-15. On the prominence of Levinson, Dewey, and 
Robins in this regard, see, for example, William Hard, The Outlawry of War, 120 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 136, 136 (1925); and OONA HATHAWAY & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE 
INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW THE RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD ch. 5 
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS]. On the 
shift to seeing war as a global public wrong, rather than a bilateral matter, see, for example, 
Henry L. Stimson, The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development, 11 FOREIGN AFF. (SPECIAL 
SUPPLEMENT) vii, xi-xii (1932); and Quincy Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 39, 59 (1933). Scott Shapiro and Oona Hathaway argue that this (and not the later 
U.N. Charter or the Nuremberg judgments) was the transformative moment in the transi-
tion of contemporary international law as a whole towards a global system of “outcasting,” 
rather than unilateral enforcement in bilateral relationships. HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, THE IN-
TERNATIONALISTS, supra. For their initial statement on outcasting, see Oona Hathaway & 
Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 
(2011) [hereinafter Hathaway & Shapiro, Outcasting]. 
22. Opening Statement at Nuremberg by Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the United 
States, United States v. Göring (Nov. 21, 1945), in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BE-
FORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 98, 102 (1947) [hereinafter Jackson Opening 
Statement at Nuremberg]. 
23. Id. at 145. Shortly after the trial, Jackson opined that the prosecution of the Nazi leaders, in-
cluding for the crime of aggressive war, “may constitute the most important moral advance 
to grow out of this war.” ROBERT H. JACKSON, Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, 
October 7, 1946, in, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 432, 439 (1949). Jackson’s colleague 
Whitney Harris emphasized the “moral condemnation” underpinning the prosecutions. 
HARRIS, supra note 2, at 529. 
24. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 461-66. 
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doing wrong” and insisted that “it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed 
to go unpunished.”
25
 It emphasized in this respect such wars’ wrongfulness in 
“the conscience of the world,” terming aggression “essentially an evil thing” 
and the “supreme international crime.”
26
 The U.S.-administered Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals (NMT) took a similar line.
27 
A normative account seeks to make sense of such a legal posture. What is it 
that makes aggression a “high crime” rather than a “mere tort” in international 
law?
28
 What moral judgment underpins that status? To hold that such ques-
tions have answers is not to hold that any particular individual must accept the 
moral posture underpinning the substance of the law in all cases; it is merely to 
recognize the law’s internal claim to normativity.
29
 
Thus, to give a normative account of a law is to endeavor to inhabit the in-
ternal legal point of view.
30
 This means starting not from ﬁrst principles, but 
from an analysis of the current law. However, it also means seeking to account 
for that law’s underlying moral claim, rather than seeking merely to describe or 
interpret the rule. The premise of the argument that follows is that a normative 
 
25. Id. at 462; see Jackson Opening Statement at Nuremberg, supra note 22, at 147 (“[I]f it be 
thought that the Charter . . . does contain new law I still do not shrink from demanding its 
strict application . . . . I cannot subscribe to the perverted reasoning that society may ad-
vance and strengthen the rule of law by the expenditure of morally innocent lives but that 
progress in the law may never be made at the price of morally guilty lives.”). 
26. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 427, 465; see also HARRIS, supra note 2, at 528-29 (“Insofar as 
these invasions were acts of pure aggression, and wholly without legal justiﬁcation, the re-
sultant killings offended the conscience of mankind . . . . It is, after all, moral condemnation 
which underlies legal prosecution.”). It sourced the law of war “not only in treaties,” but also 
in “general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts.” IMT 
Judgment, supra note 2, at 464. 
27. Ministries Case, supra note 2, at 318-19 (ﬁnding that aggressive war was “essentially wrong” 
even before the Kellogg-Briand Pact). 
28. Harry F. Cunningham, Note, Meaning of “Aggression” in the United Nations Charter, 33 NEB. L. 
REV. 606, 608 (1954). 
29. This normative dimension is essential to what makes it law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 40 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that the law is not merely a set of commands backed by 
the threat of punishment, but that it also speciﬁes subjects’ obligations, including for those 
who want to comply); id. at 55-57 (distinguishing legal rules from mere social habits, and 
noting that, from the internal point of view, those who violate the law are subject to legiti-
mate and well-founded criticism); see also Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of 
View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2006) [hereinafter Shapiro, Internal Point of View] 
(“Seen from the internal point of view, the law is not simply sanction-threatening, -
directing, or -predicting, but rather obligation-imposing.”). This is why it makes sense 
(even from a positivist perspective) to talk of the law’s “moral aim.” See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY 214-17 (2011). 
30. See, e.g., HART, supra note 29, at 89-91; Shapiro, Internal Point of View, supra note 29. 
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account is superior to its alternatives in achieving that objective to the extent 
that it better satisﬁes three core criteria. First, it must offer an explanation for 
what the regime unambiguously permits and prohibits concerning the issue at 
hand. Second, it ought to reﬂect the law’s core purposes, as evinced in the law’s 
structure and in the articulations of its framers. Third, it should cohere with 
connected or related laws in domains adjacent to that which it explains. In 
forthcoming work, I argue that if multiple accounts pass the ﬁrst three tests, 
the superior remaining account is that which is most morally plausible.
31
 How-
ever, that more controversial claim is unnecessary here, because the question 
that motivates this Article can be answered comprehensively with reference to 
the three primary criteria. 
The ﬁrst is a straightforward and inﬂexible threshold criterion. The essen-
tial feature of any normative account is an explanation of the morality of a giv-
en legal rule. It must explain what the law is, not what the law should be. The 
second and third criteria are more ﬂexible. They do much of the work in dis-
tinguishing between better and worse accounts, but they are not minimum es-
sential criteria. At their core is the basic observation that the law’s credibility as 
a normative system depends on the schedule of imperatives it issues cohering 
with the public purposes those imperatives serve in a structure of mutual sup-
port, rather than collapsing into discord or internal contradiction.
32
 When the 
normative messages of different laws conﬂict, this undermines both the law’s 
credibility in condemning violations and its authority in demanding action. 
Given the fragmented nature of international law’s enforcement and the rarity 
of credible coercive backing, this internal-coherence imperative is particularly 
acute at the global level.
33
 
 
31. See Tom Dannenbaum, Why Aggression Is a Crime and Why It Matters (unpublished man-
uscript) (on ﬁle with author). 
32. On the role of coherence in legal reasoning generally, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 
(1986); JOSEPH RAZ, The Relevance of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 277 
(1994); Robert Alexy & Aleksander Peczenik, The Concept of Coherence and Its Signiﬁcance for 
Discursive Rationality, 3 RATIO JURIS 130 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 9 
CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1982); Ken Kress, Coherence, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 533 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010); Barbara Baum Levenbook, 
The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning, 3 LAW & PHIL. 355 (1984); and Neil MacCormick, 
Coherence in Legal Justiﬁcation, in THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFER-
ENCE ON LEGAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, LUND, SWEDEN, DECEMBER 11-14, 
1983, at 235 (Aleksander Peczenik et al. eds., 1984). 
33. Thomas Franck argues that “[i]f a decision has been reached by a discursive synthesis of le-
gitimacy and justice, it is more likely to be implemented and less likely to be disobeyed.” 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 481 (1995). For 
Franck, coherence is essential in this respect. In another book, he refers to the “relationship, 
not only between a rule, its various parts, and its purpose, but also between the particular 
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However, although coherence among laws and between legal rules and 
their stated objectives is an important trait of a good normative account of the 
law, it cannot be an essential criterion. Law is created and revised by the cumu-
lative efforts of different agents, acting at different times with different objec-
tives. It is the product of compromise and sometimes of deliberate efforts by 
competing lawmakers to create internal contradictions. As a result, it may be 
impossible in any given case to provide a normative account that both explains 
the moral core of a particular law and ﬁts with the regime’s purpose or with ad-
jacent rules. In that scenario, the best normative account of the law in question 
will be dissonant with the regime as a whole. When no coherent alternative is 
viable, work on normative underpinnings can be valuable in helping to identify 
such dissonance. 
The core claim of this Article, substantiated primarily in Part III, is that 
judged against these three criteria, a normative account of the crime of aggres-
sion that locates the wrong in the constituent killings is superior to the tradi-
tionally dominant alternative. To set the stage for that argument, consider ﬁrst 
the nature and the appeal of the latter view. 
i i .  the orthodox normative account of the crime of 
aggression 
On the dominant normative account, the crime of aggression is a macro 
wrong against a foreign state (sometimes understood to draw its moral value 
from the self-determining collective it represents), not a compound of minor 
wrongs against a population of individual human persons. This sovereignty-
focused understanding of aggression has long been the view of both critics and 
defenders of the criminalization of illegal war. 
 
rule, its underlying principle, and the principles underpinning other rules of that society.” 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 153 (1990). For a more 
complete discussion, see id. at 135-182. On the jus ad bellum, Hersch Lauterpacht observes, “A 
treaty is not concluded in a legal vacuum. It is part of a legal system which, for that very rea-
son, cannot contain rules which are contradictory.” Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Op-
eration of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 206, 209 (1953). Thus, he argues, “once a 
treaty has been adopted which is of a fundamental and comprehensive character, it is diffi-
cult—and probably unscientiﬁc—to act on the view that it settles only that part of the law to 
which it expressly refers and nothing else.” Id. 
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A. The Walzerian Account: The State as Victim and Perpetrator in the Law 
The legal starting point for the orthodox account is clear. The judgments of 
the IMT and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE) de-
scribed the crime of aggression as that of waging “aggressive wars” against oth-
er “countries” or “nations.”
34
 In addition, both tribunals arranged their ﬁndings 
regarding aggression into individual criminal wars, identiﬁed and separated by 
victim state.
35
 Similarly, Control Council Law No. 10, which governed the 
NMT, provided that the crime involved the “initiation of invasions of other 
countries,”
36
 and the ICC amendment follows the General Assembly’s 1974 ar-
ticulation in deﬁning an aggressive war as one that violates the “sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State” or otherwise 
runs contrary to the U.N. Charter.
37
 
It is against this background that Michael Walzer describes international 
law on this issue as rooted morally in a “domestic analogy,” in which aggression 
is an infringement upon the attacked state akin to the infringement of burglary 
on a human person.
38
 Under this “legalist paradigm,” states “possess rights 
more or less as individuals do.”
39
 After all, he contends, it is “the state that 
 
34. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 433; IMTFE Judgment, supra note 2, at 49,136; see also IMTFE 
Judgment, supra note 2, at 48,922, 48,936 (ﬁnding that states were the “intended victims of 
Japanese aggression”). 
35. See, e.g., IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 439-58; JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD 
ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 136 (1958) (noting that 
the IMT found “that Germany had been guilty of aggression against no less than twelve 
States”). 
36. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 2, art. II ¶1(a). 
37. UNGA Deﬁnition of Aggression, supra note 3, art. 1; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis 
(2); see also Elements of Crimes, INT’L CRIM. CT. 30 (2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/resource 
-library/Documents/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [http://perma.cc/8VEX-6XJF] (deﬁning 
the elements of the crimes of aggression, one of which is “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State”); 
ILC, Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 3, art. 16 ¶ 4 (“The rule of international law which 
prohibits aggression applies to the conduct of a State in relation to another State.”). 
38. WALZER, supra note 11, at 58. On the relationship between Walzer’s work and the law, see 
infra note 42. 
39. WALZER, supra note 11, at 58, 61. Jeff McMahan observes that underpinning “‘the traditional 
theory’ of the just war, the law of war, and common-sense thought about war” (which he re-
jects) is precisely this analogy, on which he adds,  
[w]hen a state confronts a wrongful threat to its political sovereignty or territorial 
integrity, this is thought to be analogous to an individual’s confronting a wrong-
ful threat to life or limb . . . . Loss of sovereignty is . . . for a state, analogous to 
death, while a loss of territory is like an amputation.  
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claims against all other states the twin rights of territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty”—the rights that the crime of aggression seeks to protect.
40
 Under-
stood in this way, aggression is a morally unique international crime. Whereas 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are all rooted in wrongs 
against human beings, the normative heart of aggression is a wrong against 
states.
41
 
Seeking to make moral sense of this idea,
42
 Walzer argues that it captures 
the genuine wrong an aggressive war inﬂicts on the attacked political collec-
tive—a collective that is deﬁned imperfectly, but, all things considered, opti-
mally, by state borders. For him, “[t]he state is constituted by the union of 
 
  Jeff McMahan, What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War?, in THE MORALITY OF DEFEN-
SIVE WAR 115, 118 (Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar eds., 2014). At Nuremberg, prosecutor Telford 
Taylor dismissed the notion that Germany’s invasion of Poland was intended to be a blood-
less annexation, not a war of aggression, on the grounds that “it has never been a defense 
that a robber is surprised by the resistance of his victim, and has to commit murder in order 
to get the money.” Telford Taylor, Statement of the Prosecution, United States v. Göring, Judg-
ment (30 Aug. 30, 1946), in 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 271, 280 (1948). 
40. Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, in THINKING POLITI-
CALLY 219, 221 (David Miller ed., 2007); cf. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (2) (deﬁn-
ing an act of aggression as a “use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations”). 
41. Jens Iverson, Contrasting the Normative and Historical Foundations of Transitional Justice and 
Jus Post Bellum, in JUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 80, 96 (Car-
sten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014) (ﬁnding that aggression prose-
cutions “do not implicate human rights violations”); Carsten Stahn, The “End”, the “Begin-
ning of the End” or the “End of the Beginning”? Introducing Debates and Voices on the Deﬁnition of 
“Aggression,” 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 875, 877 (2010) (noting that the crime of aggression “ex-
tends criminalization from its current focus on gross human rights violations and victims’ 
rights to interstate relations, the protection of state interests (‘sovereignty’, ‘territorial integ-
rity’, ‘political independence’), and the preservation of peace”); see also supra notes 8-14 and 
accompanying text. 
42. Just and Unjust Wars engages with the interstices of the law, history, and morality of Nu-
remberg and its legacy. Although Walzer writes that such trials “by no means exhaust the 
ﬁeld of [moral] judgment” on the jus ad bellum, WALZER, supra note 11, at 288, the text fre-
quently engages with the speciﬁcs of the Nuremberg cases, and is replete with moral analy-
sis that uses the term “crime” rather than “wrong.” His starting paradigm, as elaborated in 
the ﬁrst part of the book, is the “legalist paradigm.” Id. at 61. Here, in particular, Walzer 
offers a normative account of the regime. He then tweaks that account at the margins to ac-
commodate concerns inadequately addressed by that framework. 
    Walzer’s account has achieved such widespread inﬂuence that he has been termed the 
“dean of contemporary just war theorists.” Brian Orend, War, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(rev. ed. July 28, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/war [http://
perma.cc/RK6G-RH74]. 
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people and government,”
43
 and the jus ad bellum’s relationship to individual 
human beings is in its protection of their “communal rights” of self-
determination.
44
 “Break into the [state] enclosures,” Walzer explains, “and you 
destroy the communities. And that destruction is a loss to the individual mem-
bers . . . .”
45
 In other words, if individuals are wronged when their state is in-
vaded illegally, that wrong is suffered only indirectly, through the wrong to the 
political collective of which they are part. 
Emphasizing the priority status of the collective here, Walzer insists that 
the wrong of aggression obtains irrespective of the responsiveness of the com-
munity to its members. It obtains whether or not the state is democratic or re-
spectful of human rights and the rights of minorities. Only “when a govern-
ment turns savagely upon its own people” does Walzer think the morality of 
states that underpins the crime loses its force because the state ceases to be a 
viable forum for collective self-determination.
46
 Signiﬁcantly, however, despite 
arguing that the morality of states’ rights ﬁnds its limit in this extreme context, 
Walzer is clear that his philosophical position on this point is a departure from 
the moral underpinnings of the law.
47
 In other words, for Walzer, the legal 
crime of aggression is rooted fundamentally in a moral wrong between states. 
On extraordinary occasion, that statist morality may be misguided, but for the 
most part, Walzer not only identiﬁes it as the moral posture underpinning in-
ternational law on aggression, but also defends it as morally appropriate.
48
 For 
him, the crime of aggression captures a real wrong—a wrong against the state, 
the moral value of which is derived from its function as a site of collective self-
determination. 
 
43. Walzer, supra note 40, at 221. 
44. Id. at 230; see also WALZER, supra note 11, at 61, 90, 96 (discussing aggression’s violation of 
the “communal autonomy” of the state and the “right of men and women to build a com-
mon life”). 
45. Walzer, supra note 40, at 234. 
46. WALZER, supra note 11, at 101. See generally id. at 101-08 (discussing humanitarian interven-
tion). It is in this scenario that the law’s equation of political collective with the state is, for 
Walzer, imperfect. 
47. Id. at 86. 
48. Id. at 51-108; see also Charles R. Beitz, Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics, 
33 INT’L ORG. 405, 408-09 (1979) (discussing Walzer’s theory in relation to other theories 
about the “morality of states”); David Luban, Preventive War, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 211-
13, 211 n.2 (2004) (noting that Walzer’s core normative account of the legalist paradigm 
“represent[s] [Walzer’s moral] baseline, not his ﬁnal position [which accommodates hu-
manitarian intervention, for example]. But the [sovereignty-focused] baseline captures the 
core of the Charter system”). 
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This assessment has been endorsed repeatedly. For example, Paul Kahn 
contends that the criminalization of aggression at Nuremberg represented and 
initiated a “new legal regime founded on protecting state sovereignty through 
the prohibition on the use of force.”
49
 Kahn sees this prohibition as an effort to 
ban and condemn violations of “positive sovereignty, understood as the self-
formation of a people” in a state whose boundaries allow that people to func-
tion as “a single, collective actor.”
50
 Similarly, Christopher Kutz argues that ag-
gression’s wrong is in denying the target state’s people the chance to make 
“their politics on their own”—a denial that Kutz argues wrongs nondemocratic 
peoples no less than democratic ones.
51
 Unlike Walzer and Kahn, Kutz does not 
link this moral theory to the law. However, by locating the moral violation at 
the heart of aggression in its negation of collective autonomy through its in-
fringement of states’ rights, he buttresses Walzer’s dominant account of the le-
gal regime.
52
 
Each of these theorists identiﬁes the political collective as the sovereign that 
is wronged by aggression. The core point for each is that aggression is a wrong 
against that collective that cannot itself be “reduced,” in David Rodin’s words, 
to an aggregation of harms against individuals.
53
 
Larry May arrives at a similar conclusion without relying on self-
determination. He argues that “aggression is morally wrong because it destabi-
lizes States that generally protect human rights more than they curtail them.”
54
 
For May, then, the state’s value lies in its service to human beings, rather than 
in its approximation of the political collective. Nonetheless, on his theory, the 
wrong of aggression remains a wrong against the state. This, he argues, has 
implications not just for how we understand the victim, but also how we deﬁne 
the perpetrator. Precisely because the wrong at the core of the crime of aggres-
sion occurs on the macro level, “the acts of individuals that make up war are 
conceptually and normatively distinct from the State aggression.”
55
 This, he 
contends, raises a question about how we can hold even high-ranking individ-
 
49. PAUL W. KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 54-55 (2008). 
50. Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 259, 262-63 (2004). 
51. Christopher Kutz, Democracy, Defence, and the Threat of Intervention, in THE MORALITY OF 
DEFENSIVE WAR, supra note 39, at 229, 231, 236. 
52. Id. at 237; see also id. at 241-42 (discussing the “people’s political agency”). 
53. DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 6, 127-32 (2002). 
54. LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 6-7 (2008). 
55. Id. at 15. 
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uals “criminally liable for invading Poland,” since the core interstate wrong is 
simply not something that they can commit.
56
 
Of course, crimes against humanity and genocide have collective elements 
of their own: the former involves a widespread and systematic attack; the latter, 
an intent to destroy a group. But what distinguishes aggression for May is that 
the micro contributions of the participants in an aggressive war “are not them-
selves criminal,”
57 and, indeed, are “not themselves wrong independent of what 
is going on at the State level.”
58
 Accordingly, May contends that rooting the 
wrong of aggression in the component killings and destruction would provide 
“no relevant moral distinction between aggressive wars and defensive wars.”
59
 
The result, May explains, is that aggression is not a wrong that individuals 
(“even lots of them”) can commit, unless they control the state itself.
60
 High-
ranking officials can be morally connected to that interstate wrong only if they 
combine the right level of control over the state with the intention to shape 
state action.
61 
Just as Walzer’s, Kutz’s, and Kahn’s accounts of the state as victim of ag-
gression might be thought to explain morally the fact that the crime of aggres-
sion involves an attack on the state, May’s exploration of what it means to per-
petrate the macro wrong of aggression could be argued to illuminate another 
important aspect of the legal framework—namely, that criminal liability turns 
on acting through the state.
62
 At Nuremberg, that an individual made a sub-
stantial contribution to an aggressive war or organized massive lethal attacks 
on enemy troops was not enough to make that individual criminally liable.
63
 
The same is true for an individual who had been aware of the criminal nature 
 
56. Id. at 250-51. 
57. Id. at 229. 
58. Id. at 256. 
59. Id. at 339. 
60. Id. at 256. 
61. Id. at 254. 
62. Walzer, too, suggests that the macro feature of the crime is two-dimensional—with the 
wrong inﬂicted on a victim state by individuals acting through a perpetrator state. See supra note 
40 and accompanying text. 
63. Twenty-four members of I.G. Farben’s managing board were acquitted of jus ad bellum 
crimes on the grounds that they were “followers and not leaders,” I.G. Farben Case, supra 
note 6, at 1126, despite the fact that “Farben largely created the broad raw material basis 
without which the policy makers could not have even seriously considered waging aggres-
sive war,” id. at 1216 (Herbert, J., concurring). The high-ranking military officers acquitted 
in the High Command Case were, of course, in charge of organizing major belligerent Ger-
man operations. See High Command Case, supra note 6, at 463-65. 
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of the war and who acted under no duress.
64
 Thus, even senior members of the 
Nazi High Command were acquitted of crimes against peace.
65
 Only members 
of Hitler’s “inner circle,” who were able to “shape or inﬂuence” state policy, 
were found guilty.
66
 Similarly, under the ICC amendment, criminal liability for 
aggression is limited to persons with the capacity to “exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State.”
67
 
From this perspective, the macro nature of the crime is two-dimensional. 
The moral wrong at the core of aggression is a wrong inﬂicted on a victim state 
(or at least the collective it represents) by individuals acting through a perpe-
 
64. See id. at 462, 488 (“[M]ere knowledge [of the aggressive character of the war] is not suffi-
cient to make participation even by high ranking military officers in the war criminal.”). The 
leadership requirement has in no context been connected to a duress standard. 
65. Id. at 462-63, 491. A small number of senior Nazi members of the military—such as Chief of 
the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) and Field Mar-
shal Wilhelm Keitel—were convicted of crimes against peace at Nuremberg despite proffer-
ing the superior orders defense. Final Statement of Dr. Otto Nelte, Counsel for Wilhelm Keitel, 
Monday 8 July 1946, in 17 THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 603, 660-661 (1948); Final Statement of Dr. Otto Nelte, Counsel 
for Wilhelm Keitel, Tuesday 9 July 1946, in 18 THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BE-
FORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 1, 37-38 (1948); IMT Judgment, supra note 2, 
at 533-36. However, these men were part of Hitler’s leadership cabal at the top of the chain of 
command. Keitel’s own lawyer described him as in Hitler’s “closest circle and [as] his almost 
constant companion.” Final Statement of Dr. Otto Nelte, Counsel for Wilhelm Keitel, Monday 8 
July 1946, supra, at 614. On the focus on those who controlled the Nazi state apparatus, see 
HARRIS, supra note 2, at 29-30; and Jackson, supra note 7, at 197-98. As an aside, the NMT 
set a lower threshold for criminal liability for preparing for war than for participating in its 
initiation or continuation. Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Re-
quirement in the Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 477, 482-85 (2007). 
66. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 547, 555 (ﬁnding those who were not members of Hitler’s 
“inner circle” not guilty of crimes against peace); High Command Case, supra note 6, at 488 
(discussing the “shape or inﬂuence” test); see also I.G. Farben Case, supra note 6, at 1102 
(“No defendant was convicted under the charge of participating in the common plan or con-
spiracy unless he was . . . in such close relationship with Hitler that he must have been in-
formed of Hitler’s aggressive plans and took action to carry them out, or attended at least 
one of the four secret meetings at which Hitler disclosed his plans for aggressive war.”). 
67. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis. These Amendments built on the ILC’s earlier work, 
which operated on the basic premise that “[i]ndividual responsibility for [a crime of aggres-
sion] is intrinsically and inextricably linked to the commission of aggression by a State.” 
ILC, Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 3, at 43 ¶ 4, cmt. to art. 16. Heller has argued that this 
is a higher threshold than the “shape or inﬂuence” standard adopted at Nuremberg. Heller, 
supra note 65, at 495. However, even accepting that distinction, the point here is that both 
seem to root criminal liability in the individual’s connection to the macro policy to invade 
another state. 
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trator state.
68
 Importantly, for Walzer and others adopting his view, this is not 
just a moral account of the legal posture on aggression; it is also a moral defense 
of that posture. From that perspective, in an aggressive war, a genuine wrong 
occurs at the interstate level and that wrong is worthy of criminal punishment 
and official condemnation. 
B. Criticizing the Criminalization of Aggression on Walzerian Terms 
Critics of the criminalization of aggression agree with the Walzerian nor-
mative account of the law. They agree, in other words, that the crime of aggres-
sion is rooted in a claimed moral wrong “against a state” as opposed to “viola-
tions against individuals.”
69
 The difference is that, for the critics, this account 
of the crime spotlights precisely why it should not be a crime at all. 
David Luban, for example, accepts that “the crime of aggressive war is a 
crime of state against state.”
70
 However, for him, this is where the Nuremberg 
endeavor took a wrong normative turn. Luban insists that “the achievements at 
which the trial was aiming were compromised, rendered equivocal, by the trial 
itself,” with the framers “unwilling to question . . . the political system of na-
tion-states.”
71
 The problem, he argues, was precisely the Walzerian effort to 
“confer moral rights” on the state.
72
 By developing a crime that depends on 
such moral rights, Nuremberg “erected a wall around state sovereignty.”
73
 
Whereas crimes against humanity, together with the removal of official im-
munity and the imposition of liability for obeying orders that were legal ac-
cording to the sovereign state, seemed to “perforate[] or even destroy[]” the 
classical doctrine of sovereignty “in the name of ‘humanity,’” Article 6(a) of the 
IMT Statute “fortiﬁed it by making aggressive war—a violation of sovereign-
ty—an international crime.”
74
 The result, for Luban, is that Nuremberg’s “cen-
tral achievement” of recognizing crimes against humanity was undermined, 
 
68. ILC, Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 3, at 43, ¶ 4, cmt. to art. 16; STONE, supra note 35, at 
141. 
69. Letter from Aryeh Neier to Foreign Ministers, supra note 8; see also International Criminal 
Court, supra note 9 (drawing a distinction between the crime of aggression and other crimes 
such as genocide and crimes against humanity). 
70. Luban, supra note 19, at 164, 166; see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 337 (1994) (arguing 
that the General Assembly cast aggression as “the violation of sovereignty” in 1974, in keep-
ing with the “spirit of Nuremberg”). 
71. LUBAN, supra note 70, at 335. 
72. Luban, supra note 19, at 164. 
73. LUBAN, supra note 70, at 337. 
74. Id. at 338-39. 
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and that the trials left “a legacy that is at best equivocal and at worst immoral,” 
with the criminalization of aggression “a major moral enemy of the human 
rights movement.”
75
 
Reacting to ICC’s pending amendment, Erin Creegan has put forth an up-
dated version of this sentiment. She argues, “[A]ggression . . . is a crime com-
mitted by the leadership of one state, directed against the abstract interests of 
another state . . . . The harm of aggression is the insult to a state’s territorial in-
dependence and sovereignty . . . . [P]reventing wartime suffering is not the di-
rect object of the crime of aggression . . . .”
76
 
Like Luban, Creegan ﬁnds this to be an unacceptable normative core. She 
contends that, “[w]ithout adversely affected human victims, it is hard to put a 
crime like aggression in a category similar to war crimes or crimes against hu-
manity or genocide. And it does not seem to belong next to them; it almost 
demeans them.”
77
 She goes on to describe human beings’ rights not to be sub-
ject to the wrongs of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as 
often “inﬁnitely more” powerful than the right of states not to be the victims of 
aggression.
78
 
The dispute between Walzer and his critics on this issue is complex. From 
the internal legal point of view, they are in close agreement as to the basic mor-
al underpinnings of the crime. For both sides, the crime is premised on the idea 
that aggression is a wrong against states (or the political collectives they repre-
sent).
79
 Morally, however, they disagree about whether violating a state in that 
way is a wrong worthy of criminalization. Their agreement from the internal 
point of view is at the heart of their disagreement from the external point of 
view. 
As discussed in Part V, if one accepts the widespread conception of aggres-
sion as an exclusively macro-level wrong, that understanding must underpin 
the “object and purpose” of the criminalization of aggression, with all of the en-
tailed consequences for the proper interpretation of the crime and of connected 
 
75. Id. at 335-37, 341. 
76. Erin Creegan, Justiﬁed Uses of Force and the Crime of Aggression, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 59, 62 
(2012). 
77. Id. at 63. 
78. Id. at 68. 
79. Notably, Luban describes Walzer’s defense as “the best defense I know” of the crime of ag-
gression and the focus on sovereignty at its moral core. LUBAN, supra note 70, at 342 n.19. 
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rights and duties.
80
 Those implications would hold whether or not one endors-
es the law as morally well directed. 
But the shared premise is mistaken. The next Part reframes how we ought 
to understand aggression from the internal legal point of view. The normative 
core of the crime of aggression is not a morality of states’ or political collectives’ 
rights, but a morality that condemns the unjustiﬁed killing of human persons. 
i i i . why aggressive war is  an international crime 
To be clear, the position advanced here is not that sovereignty is irrelevant 
to the crime of aggression. Under current international law, whether a war is 
criminal is determined in part by whether it violates the “sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State” or is otherwise “incon-
sistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”
81
 In other words, which wars 
are wrongful is a macro-level question that depends typically, although not ex-
clusively, on which side has violated the other’s sovereignty. 
But that interstate breach is not why waging such wars is criminal. Waging 
war in breach of those interstate rules is criminal because it entails widespread 
killing and the inﬂiction of human suffering without justiﬁcation. Seen in this 
way, aggression is a modiﬁed form of crime against humanity, perpetrated or-
dinarily through a violation of sovereignty.
82
 
To understand why this must be the case, consider the point from ﬁve per-
spectives. First, the concept of sovereign rights is indeterminate as a normative 
guide on the issue of aggression. The criminalization of such wars is as great a 
restraint on state sovereignty as it is a protection of it. Moreover, interstate vio-
lations that more effectively and dramatically infringe core sovereign rights 
than does aggressive war are not criminal. Second, what distinguishes aggres-
sion from any other sovereignty violation is that it involves killing without the 
 
80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (requir-
ing that treaty interpretation must proceed “in the light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose” 
and in the light of “[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties”). 
81. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (2); see supra Section II.A. 
82. Contrast the positions canvassed supra Section II.B. A key difference between aggression and 
the formal category of crimes against humanity is that the latter involves the perpetration of 
wrongs against a civilian population, whereas the former is concerned centrally with wrongs 
perpetrated against combatants. Cf. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (deﬁning and prohib-
iting crimes against humanity); infra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing aggres-
sion’s protection of combatants); infra Section V.C (discussing aggression’s relation to the 
rights of soldiers). 
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justiﬁcation of responding to human violence or its immediate threat. Other 
forms of killing without justiﬁcation are criminal in another form. By protect-
ing combatants’ and collateral civilians’ right to life, the criminalization of ag-
gression ﬁlls a crucial gap in that broader criminal-law approach to unjustiﬁed 
killing. Third, understanding aggression in this way reconciles its criminaliza-
tion with the so-called “humanization” of international law—the rise of the 
human being as a normative focal point in legal interpretation and doctrinal 
development. This phenomenon is manifest especially clearly in international 
criminal law. Fourth, the claimed imperative to incorporate a restrictive jus ad 
bellum into twentieth-century international law was articulated not in terms of 
sovereignty, but in terms of human suffering. Finally, wrongful killing was 
normatively central to the reasoning of the judges and prosecutors at Nurem-
berg and Tokyo on the crime of aggression. Ultimately, states’ rights are im-
portant in structuring when the use of force is permitted, but aggression is a 
crime about the inﬂiction of human death and suffering without justiﬁcation. 
Recognizing the criminal wrong of aggression to be the inﬂiction of unjus-
tiﬁed human violence suggests that legal interpretation and thinking in this 
domain might be better illuminated by a more recent, revisionist tranche of just 
war theory than has thus far been recognized. A growing cohort of moral theo-
rists has countered the longstanding Walzerian orthodoxy that the jus ad bellum 
can be restricted morally to the macro-level, with no implications for the rights 
or wrongs of the constituent actions.
83
 These revisionist theorists, led by Jeff 
McMahan, have deliberately avoided engagement with international law, some-
times criticizing Walzer for what they consider to be a conﬂation of the law and 
the morality of war.
84
 One of the upshots of the arguments in this Part is that 
these philosophical critics may have more to say about the internal normativity 
of the existing legal regime than they or international lawyers have understood. 
 
83. See infra note 265 and accompanying text. 
84. JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 105 (2009) (describing a “ubiquitous tendency to conﬂate 
the morality of war with the law of war”); id. at 112 (on Walzer); Jeff McMahan, Killing in 
War: A Reply to Walzer, 34 PHILOSOPHIA 47, 51 (2006) (“Walzer believes that what he calls 
the war convention is just an adaptation, developed over many centuries, of our ordinary 
morality to the circumstances of war. But again I have doubts.”). Walzer, for his part, argues, 
“What Jeff McMahan means to provide . . . is a careful and precise account of individual re-
sponsibility in time of war. What he actually provides, I think, is a careful and precise ac-
count of what individual responsibility in war would be like if war were a peacetime activi-
ty.” Michael Walzer, Response to McMahan’s Paper, 34 PHILOSOPHIA 43, 43 (2006). 
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A. Sovereignty Cannot Explain the Jus Ad Bellum or the Criminalization of 
Aggression 
When it comes to war, sovereignty cuts both ways. Although banning ag-
gressive war has protected certain sovereign rights, it has limited the sover-
eign’s capacity to assert and protect many of its other rights. Indeed, despite his 
framing of Nuremberg and the U.N. Charter as moves toward protecting sov-
ereignty,
85
 Kahn recognizes that on a maximal vision of sovereignty in interna-
tional affairs, “there is no difference between protection and assertion: To pro-
tect the state is to assert its power to defend its ‘vital interests.’”
86
 
Prior to Nuremberg, and certainly prior to Kellogg-Briand, international 
law reﬂected precisely that principle: states had the power and authority to use 
violence to punish or seek to end nonviolent infringements of their legal 
rights.
87
 They could wage war to settle a dispute, reverse a wrongful seizure, or 
otherwise retake what was rightfully theirs.
88
 Capturing this core doctrine, Vat-
tel wrote simply, “Whatever strikes at [a sovereign state’s] rights is an injury, 
 
85. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
86. Kahn, supra note 50, at 263. 
87. HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS, supra note 21, chs. 1-4; HANS KELSEN, 
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 331 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); STEPHEN C. NEFF, 
WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 225-39 (2005); 3 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 
COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 18-22 (2d ed. 1873); Le Régime de Représailles en 
Temps de Paix, ANNUAIRE INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 708-711 (Institut de Droit In-
ternational 1934); Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The Relationship Between Reprisals and Denun-
ciation or Suspension of a Treaty, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 351-52 (1993). 
88. HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS, supra note 21, chs. 1-4; see, e.g., Convention 
Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts 
art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241 (prohibiting the recourse to armed force for the recovery of 
contractual debts only if the debtor state submits to an offer of arbitral settlement and com-
plies with the subsequent award); Convention for the Paciﬁc Settlement of International 
Disputes art. 1, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1799 (requiring only that signatories “use their best 
efforts to insure the paciﬁc settlement of international differences” (emphasis added)); EM-
MER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO 
THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS §§ 333, 342 (Béla Kapossy & Rich-
ard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund rev. ed. 2008) (1758) (on the sovereign’s right to use force 
to vindicate its rights whenever there is a colorable rights claim and to use force to recover 
debts, repair injuries, or enact reprisals). Even the Covenant of the League of Nations al-
lowed states to resolve international disputes with force, as long as they ﬁrst submitted the 
dispute to the League of Nations Council (or arbitration or judicial settlement), and waited 
for a cooling-off period of nine months (six awaiting the ruling and three following the rul-
ing). In the case of a Council referral, force would only be banned if the Council was unani-
mous and the other state complied with its ruling. See Covenant of the League of Nations 
arts. 12-16. 
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and a just cause of war.”
89
 The use of force was the key tool of law enforcement 
and sovereignty vindication in an international regime focused on interstate re-
lations and state rights.
90
 Moreover, in the absence of a system of global insti-
tutions by which the “right” in any dispute could be veriﬁed, states also had the 
sovereign authority to determine whether such vindication was called for.
91
 
In one sense, this system rendered states vulnerable to armed attack. But 
this was not because states’ rights were unimportant. Rather, the animating 
premise was that it was inconceivable that the state’s authority to determine 
whether force was necessary to protect its legal rights could be abrogated.
92
 
The sovereign stood above international law.
93
 From that position of priority, 
what was truly defensive of its rights was necessarily something “that a state 
had to judge for itself.”
94
 Understood in this way, sovereignty “resists [the] 
universalization” upon which any genuinely restrictive jus ad bellum depends.
95
 
Recognizing this assertive dimension of sovereignty is crucial. Precisely be-
cause it lacked any meaningful jus ad bellum restraint, the pre-Nuremberg, pre-
Kellogg-Briand era was the high-water mark of sovereignty in international 
law. Thus, rather than asserting that banning war would erect “a wall around 
sovereignty,”
96
 Salmon Levinson—a vanguard advocate for what ultimately be-
came the Kellogg-Briand Pact—felt compelled to rebut the allegation that al-
lowing this “check upon [the state’s] original unlimited power” would unjusti-
 
89. VATTEL, supra note 88, § 26; see also FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, “On War” (Disputation XIII, De Tri-
plici Virtue Theologica: Charitate), in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS 797, 817 (Gladys L. 
Williams et al. trans., Clarendon Press 1944) (1610) (asserting that war may be declared to 
gain reparation for the losses suffered from any violation of a state’s rights). 
90. CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (3d ed. 1948); WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A 
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (7th ed. 1917); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 33-34 (1st ed. 1952). 
91. HERBERT WHITTAKER BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES 976 
(2d ed. 1952); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 78-79 (5th ed. 2012); 
HALL, supra note 90, at 61-62; W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Coercion and Self-
Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 642 (1984). 
92. FRANCIS LIEBER, GENERAL ORDER NO. 100: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES 
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 18 (1863) (“The law of nations allows every sovereign 
government to make war upon another sovereign state . . . .”). On one reading, states re-
tained the authority to wage war not only to enforce their existing legal rights, but also to 
initiate legal change in the absence of a global legislature. Josef L. Kunz, Editorial Comment, 
Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 528 (1951). 
93. See Kahn, supra note 50, at 263 (channeling Carl Schmitt). 
94. Id. at 263 n.18. 
95. Id. at 276. 
96. LUBAN, supra note 70, at 337. 
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ﬁably “invade” and “impair” core sovereign rights.
97
 Accepting that adopting 
the prohibition would limit sovereignty, Levinson insisted that the retention of 
the sovereign right to use force at its own discretion was morally indefensible.
98
 
Along similar lines, Frank Kellogg acknowledged in a public address after the 
signing of the Pact that the key obstacle facing the drafters had been the 
longstanding notion that waging war was simply “a nation’s legal right.”
99
 
Of course, although the criminalization of aggression and the prohibition 
against the use of force have limited sovereignty in this way, the new regime 
has also enhanced states’ legal protection against armed attack.
100
 However, 
that newly protected dimension is just one element of sovereignty. Precisely be-
cause of the elevation of that element, all other aspects of sovereignty lost the 
unilateral vindication mechanism upon which they had depended.
101
 The as-
sertion and protection of those other rights have been taken away from the 
sovereign and transferred to the global collective.
102
 
The obvious defense of the traditional account here would be to argue that 
the ban on aggression prohibited and criminalized the most severe violation of 
state sovereignty in exchange for eliminating lesser sovereign rights. Had that 
been the exchange, a sovereignty-focused account could explain why aggres-
sion, alone among sovereignty violations, is an international crime and a viola-
tion of jus cogens.
103
 The explanation would be that aggression has this special 
 
97. LEVINSON, supra note 21, at 12, 21. On Levinson’s role in the move to ban war, see supra note 
21. 
98. LEVINSON, supra note 21, at 22 (“A sovereign nation that would set itself up above all the laws 
of justice in its dealings with other nations is unworthy to retain its sovereignty.”). 
99. Frank B. Kellogg, Former U.S. Sec’y of State, The Pact of Paris and the Relationship of the 
United States to the World Community, An Address Delivered over the Columbia  
Broadcasting System (Oct. 30, 1935), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kb1935.asp 
[http://perma.cc/AUF5-MKAX]. 
100. In that narrow sense, despite the restrictions that this legal shift placed on a slew of sover-
eign rights, Kahn and Luban are not wrong to use the language of protection to describe the 
relationship between sovereignty and the criminalization of aggression. See supra notes 49, 
70, and accompanying text. 
101. On the role of the ban on war in transforming war from a system of unilateral enforcement 
to a system of collective enforcement, see HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS, 
supra note 21. 
102. Id. 
103. Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) (ﬁnding that the use of force is a “particularly obvious” viola-
tion of sovereignty, but the category extends to any intervention in a state’s “choice of a po-
litical, economic, social and cultural system” and “foreign policy,” among other things). For 
a detailing of various nonviolent sovereignty violations, see G.A. Res. 52/119, Respect for the 
Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of States in 
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status because it is the interstate violation most profoundly detrimental to the 
essential elements of sovereignty. 
This, however, is not the case. Put to one side all of the sovereign rights 
given up in the ban on the use of force and consider in isolation the sovereign 
rights at the crux of today’s jus ad bellum: political independence and territorial 
integrity.
104
 On these issues alone, aggression is not uniquely harmful. A crimi-
nal use of force can be far more modest in its diminution, or even intended 
diminution, of these rights than would be nonbelligerent, noncriminal in-
fringements of the same rights.
 
Consider, for example, the nonbelligerent installation of a puppet regime in 
a foreign state through the manipulation of its elections.
105
 Puppet regimes cre-
ate principal-agent problems for the intervening state, and democratic manipu-
lation will not always work ﬂawlessly. Such illegal actions, however, would in-
fringe on political independence and self-determination profoundly, and often 
to a greater extent than is even intended by an illegal military attack.
106
 And yet 
such nonviolent interventions are clearly not internationally criminal, since 
they lack “the use of armed force.”
107
 
The same applies to nonviolent violations of territorial integrity. Failing to 
hand over territory to a lawfully seceding entity, holding another state’s territo-
 
their Electoral Processes (Feb. 23, 1998); G.A. Res. 36/103, annex, Declaration on the Inad-
missibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981); 
and Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 3, at 122-23. 
104. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis. 
105. On the installation of a puppet regime as a sovereignty violation, see sources cited supra note 
103. The Nuremberg judges knew well how effectively the installation of a puppet regime 
could eviscerate a state’s political independence. See IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 433-36, 
573. For brief discussions of historical cases and future dangers of foreign electoral manipu-
lation, see, for example, Jack Goldsmith, What is Old, and New, and Scary in Russia’s Probable 
DNC Hack, LAWFARE (July 25, 2016), http://lawfareblog.com/what-old-and-new-and 
-scary-russias-probable-dnc-hack [http://perma.cc/R35B-A7DW]; and Bruce Schneier,  
By November, Russian Hackers Could Target Voting Machines, WASH. POST (July  
27, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/27/by-november 
-russian-hackers-could-target-voting-machines/ [http://perma.cc/FHU9-UML9]. 
106. Cécile Fabre has argued correctly that, to be consistent, Walzerian just war theory would 
need to classify such action as an aggression warranting defensive force. Cécile Fabre, Cos-
mopolitanism and Wars of Self-Defence, in THE MORALITY OF DEFENSIVE WAR, supra note 39, 
at 90, 103-04; see Kutz, supra note 51, at 242-43 (asserting precisely such a claim in moral 
theory but not as a matter of law). 
107. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (2). This exclusive focus on armed force, explicit in the 
criminal provision, is also generally understood to apply to Article 2, ¶ 4 of the U.N. Char-
ter. See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N USE OF FORCE COMM., REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE 
OF FORCE §§ A.2, C.3 (2014) [hereinafter ILA USE OF FORCE COMM. REPORT], http://www
.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1036 [http://perma.cc/QM4M-MAPE]. 
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ry following a misguided handover from a departing former colonial power, or 
illegally manipulating an independence referendum in a way that triggers an 
effective secession are all severe infringements of another state’s territorial in-
tegrity.
108
 However, without an armed attack, none would be internationally 
criminal.
109
 
By contrast, examples of criminal aggression listed in the ICC amendment, 
such as aerial bombardment or an attack on a foreign state’s naval ﬂeet, may do 
very little to undermine the victim state’s self-determination, territorial integri-
ty, or political independence.
110
 The same is true of drone strike campaigns 
against nonstate actors in foreign territory, which are perfectly compatible with 
leaving intact the political independence and territorial integrity of the host 
state.
111
 The point is not just that such belligerent acts may prove unsuccessful 
in taking territory or overthrowing the government.
112
 More fundamentally, it 
is that criminal aggression need not even pursue the objective of undermining 
signiﬁcantly those core elements of sovereignty.
113
 
The fact that belligerent actions with minimal impact or intended impact 
on sovereignty are criminal, while nonviolent infringements of political inde-
pendence and territorial integrity are not, cannot be explained with reference to 
 
108. For an example of the ﬁrst case, see Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10). 
109. Whether actions like Russia’s role in the 2014 Crimean referendum qualify as criminal ag-
gressions is discussed in Sections IV.A and V.A, infra. The best interpretation is that they do 
not, but they are marginal cases. Crucially, however, if they are criminal, it is because of their 
latent human violence. 
110. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (2). 
111. Cf. HOUSE OF LORDS HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GOV-
ERNMENT’S POLICY ON THE USE OF DRONES FOR TARGETED KILLING, SECOND REPORT OF SES-
SION, 2015-16, HL 141, HC 574, ¶ 3.40 (UK) (indicating that an assertion of the right to tar-
get “any member of ISIL/Da’esh anywhere” in the world is incompatible with the jus ad 
bellum). 
112. Consider, for example, Iraq’s failed aggression against Iran. See U.N. Secretary-General, 
Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 
(1987), ¶¶ 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/23273 (Dec. 9, 1991), quoted in R.K. Ramazani, Who Started the 
Iraq-Iran War?: A Commentary, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 69, 84-85, 87-89 (1992) [hereinafter Fur-
ther Report of the Secretary-General]; see also Ige F. Dekker, Criminal Responsibility and the Gulf 
War of 1980-1988: The Crime of Aggression, in THE GULF WAR OF 1980-1988: THE IRAN-IRAQ 
WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 249, 268 (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 
1992) (arguing that Iraq engaged in a criminal war of aggression). 
113. Compare, for example, the Security Council’s ﬁnding that Israeli airstrikes in Tunis in 1985 
amounted to aggression, even though the target was the Palestine Liberation Organization 
headquarters, not Tunisian governmental targets, and there was no effort to take territory. 
S.C. Res. 573 (Oct. 4, 1985); see also infra notes 132-143 and accompanying text. 
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the degree to which each action violates those core sovereignty rights. If that 
were the standard, the outcomes would be reversed. The crime as currently 
constituted must be explained by something else. 
B. The Human Core of Aggression 
Far more robust as a normative explanation of the crime than the fact or 
degree of aggression’s violation of sovereignty or states’ rights is the form of 
that violation, the means by which it is perpetrated.
114
 What is unique about 
illegal war among violations of states’ rights—what makes it criminal, when no 
other sovereignty violation is—is the fact that it entails the slaughter of human 
life, the inﬂiction of human suffering, and the erosion of human security. To 
qualify as aggression, those harms must occur ordinarily (although not exclu-
sively) in an unjustiﬁed attack in which one state infringes the core sovereign 
rights of another. However, it is the unjustiﬁed killing and inﬂiction of human 
suffering, and not the violation of sovereignty, that are the wrongs at the heart 
of aggression. Consider three ways in which this is so. 
First, even within the category of violent interstate interactions, the reason 
that a particular aggressive attack is unjustiﬁed is not that it infringes the target 
state’s territorial integrity or political independence. Assuming no Security 
Council authorization, what determines that one side of an international armed 
conﬂict is in violation of the jus ad bellum is that it does not respond to an armed 
attack.
115
 Therefore, the use of force seeking to remedy or prevent a severe but 
nonviolent infringement of political independence or self-determination, such 
as the manipulation of its elections through hacking, would be illegal and could 
qualify as an act of criminal aggression.
116
 Similarly, according to the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission, it is a jus ad bellum violation, and thus at least 
potentially criminal, for a state to use force to recover its own territory, if that 
retaking does not respond to an armed attack.
117
 Indeed, even when one state 
 
114. Cf. McMahan, supra note 39, at 117 (on the importance of the means-end distinction in un-
derstanding what makes aggressive war morally wrong). 
115. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; id. art. 51; see also sources cited supra note 103. 
116. Cf. Fabre, supra note 106, at 104-05 (analyzing the morality of hypothetical forcible respons-
es to interference with the right to vote). 
117. Partial Award: Jus Ad Bellum - Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 (Eri. v. Eth.), 16 R.I.A.A. 457, 464-67 
(Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005); cf. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 3, at 122. 
The Claims Commission did not ﬁnd this particular action to be a criminal aggression. 
However, since it was a violation of the U.N. Charter, it could have qualiﬁed as aggression 
under the ICC Statute, had it been of the requisite character, gravity, and scale (thresholds it 
may well have surpassed had Badme not been a tiny, low-population border town). See 
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controls another’s territory following an armed attack by the former, if the lat-
ter’s forcible response is sufficiently delayed, it too would be illegal and poten-
tially criminal.
118
 
On the other hand, a defensive use of force that has a signiﬁcant and in-
tended impact on the aggressor’s internal structures of government or its terri-
tory would be lawful as long as that force were necessary and proportionate to 
stopping the armed attack. The paradigmatically lawful wars against Germany 
and Japan in World War II each led to long-term occupations and regime 
changes, not to mention Germany’s territorial and political fragmentation for 
half a century. 
Moreover, using force in response to a foreign armed attack is lawful, even 
if that attack does not threaten the victim’s territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence.
119
 Indeed, according to the Ethiopia-Eritrea ruling, such defensive 
uses of force are lawful even if the objective is merely to defend the attacked 
state’s personnel while they are exercising peaceful control over the aggressor’s 
own sovereign territory.
120
 
What uniﬁes these cases is that a lawful use of force by a state must re-
spond to an international attack on, or threat to, the lives of its human subjects; 
that is what it means for an attack to be armed.
121
 Of course, territorial integrity 
and political independence are often protected by defensive war and violated by 
aggressive war. But the legal realities discussed above indicate the overriding 
importance of human life and physical integrity. Severe violations of territorial 
integrity or political independence are not internationally criminal, and do not 
trigger a right to use remedial force, unless they also involve a severe threat of 
violence to human beings. At the same time, uses of force that do little or noth-
ing to protect core sovereign rights are lawful as long as they respond to an 
armed attack. Conversely, it is criminally aggressive to inﬂict violence on hu-
man beings in a foreign state even if there is no intention or signiﬁcant pro-
 
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (1-2). For a critique of the Claims Commission’s ap-
proach to the fact that Eritrea’s armed attack was inﬂicted on Ethiopian forces on Eritrean 
territory, see Christine Gray, The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its Bounda-
ries: A Partial Award?, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 699, 710-18 (2006). 
118. See DINSTEIN, supra note 91, at 230-33. 
119. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6) (“The Court 
does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient 
to bring into play the ‘inherent right of self-defence . . . .’”). 
120. See sources cited supra note 117 (demonstrating that Ethiopia was found not to have violated 
the jus ad bellum in defending itself against Eritrea’s effort to retake Badme). 
121. On threats to life (as opposed to consummated killings), see infra notes 205-214 and accom-
panying text. 
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spect of harm to territorial integrity or political independence as a result of the 
attack. Indeed, this holds even if that inﬂiction of violence aims merely to re-
cover the aggressor’s own sovereign territory. 
There are, of course, marginal jus ad bellum cases in which human life 
seems to play a less central role and core sovereignty rights appear to come to 
the fore. The most notable such case is that of the so-called “bloodless inva-
sion.”
 
I address this case at greater length in Part IV, below. However, by way of 
brief preview, whether bloodless invasions are criminal at all is at least debata-
ble. Moreover, even if they are criminal, the key to understanding their crimi-
nality is not the fact that such invasions infringe sovereignty, but rather that 
they do so by imposing the immediate threat of lethal violence against anyone 
who might resist. 
The second reason in favor of the unjustiﬁed killing account of aggression 
is that it ﬁts with the broader legal posture on violence to human beings. 
Whereas aggression is unique among sovereignty violations in its criminal sta-
tus, it is decidedly not unique in that respect among forms of large-scale killing 
and human harm that do not respond defensively to the threat or inﬂiction of 
such killing and harm. On the contrary, such nondefensive killing is generally 
criminal in one form or another. 
Perhaps the most important element of sovereignty is the state’s monopoly 
on the legitimate use of internal force. However, that authority is not unlim-
ited. When state agents inﬂict widespread killing or human harm internally, 
without responding to some form of attack or imminent internal threat, they 
commit a crime against humanity.
122
 State militaries may use force against in-
surgents in a noninternational armed conﬂict, but until such insurgents have 
formed (and thus have begun to pose an internal belligerent threat) the state 
cannot initiate such an attack. To do so would be to engage in a widespread and 
systematic attack on a civilian population.
123
 If nonstate actors coalesce into a 
 
122. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7. 
123. Unlike state armed forces, nonstate “combatants” do not exist until the protracted hostilities 
necessary to trigger a noninternational armed conﬂict are underway. See Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conﬂicts (Protocol II) art. 5, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (re-
quiring that the nonstate actor have “control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations” before the treaty is engaged); Prose-
cutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [http://perma.cc/4C98-SP5E] (requiring 
“protracted” armed violence before the law of noninternational armed conﬂict is engaged); 
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under In-
ternational Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS 27, 36 (2009), http://www.icrc
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military response to such an attack by the state, then, from that point on, such 
actors would become combatants and state forces may target them without 
committing a crime.
124
 But that transformation would not change the criminal-
ity of state actors’ initial attack on human life. 
Similarly, when nonstate actors inﬂict widespread death or human harm 
against civilians, they too commit crimes against humanity.
125
 When they in-
ﬂict harms of this kind on state armed forces or other combatants, they commit 
murder and other universally applicable domestic crimes without the interna-
tional law privileges of belligerency.
126
 Although the latter harms are not inter-
nationally criminal, they are domestically criminal in all states, and internation-
al law offers no immunity to those who perpetrate such crimes on behalf of 
nonstate actors. 
On a smaller scale, other forms of killing not justiﬁed on defensive grounds 
are war crimes.
127
 Classic examples are killing civilians or prisoners of war.
128
 
And, outside the context of armed conﬂict, killings that do not protect persons 
or the broader community are criminalized domestically as murder; interna-
tional human rights law demands as much.
129
 
 
.org/eng/assets/ﬁles/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf [http://perma.cc/D3R8-HD9F] (“[A]ll per-
sons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to 
the conﬂict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless and 
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In noninternational armed conﬂict, or-
ganized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a nonstate party to the conﬂict and 
consist only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostili-
ties . . . .”); Melzer, supra, at 33 (“[M]embership must depend on whether the continuous 
function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as 
a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the conﬂict.”). 
124. For a discussion of nonstate combatancy, see Melzer, supra note 123, at 31-35. 
125. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7. 
126. See Richard R. Baxter, So-Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 28 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323 (1951); Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged 
Combatants,” 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2003); see also, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 
2009, § 1802, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(6)-(7), 948c, 950t (2012). 
127. For relevant war crimes involving killing and human suffering, see Rome Statute, supra note 
1, art. 8. 
128. See, e.g., id. arts. 8(a)(i), 8(b)(i), (vi). 
129. On the human rights law requirement that the unjustiﬁed takings of life be met with crimi-
nal sanction, see, for example, Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124 ¶ 
115; and Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Ob-
ligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1
/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). The only nonprotective killing that need not trigger criminal sanc-
tion is the death penalty in states where it remains legal; however, its permissibility in inter-
national human rights law is fragile and awkward. Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the 
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Thus, whether perpetrated by the state, a nonstate group, or an individual, 
killing cannot be used to change even an illegal or unjust status quo unless it 
responds to human violence or the threat thereof. Of course, the point at which 
such violence or threat of violence becomes criminal varies depending on the 
actors and contexts involved. There is a presumption in favor of the legitimacy 
of internal uses (and especially threats) of force by the state and a strong pre-
sumption against the use or threat of force by nonstate actors. Similarly, the 
context of war changes the ﬂexibility of what constitutes defensive action and 
the attribution of responsibility for unjustiﬁed killing. 
In that sense, the differentiation across these crimes is important. Indeed, it 
helps to make sense of the interstate element of aggression (which typically in-
volves a sovereignty violation). Rather than being the core criminal wrong, as 
the traditional account would have it, that interstate infringement identiﬁes a 
particular form of unjustiﬁed massive killing and enables the thresholds of 
criminality to reﬂect the presumptions of legitimacy and contextual considera-
tions appropriate to that form. The state has a lower presumption of legitimacy 
using (or threatening) force internationally than it does domestically, and a 
higher presumption of legitimacy than do nonstate actors. But this differentia-
tion among crimes ought not obscure the common trait that makes them all 
crimes. The nondefensive use of lethal force by any actor is generally criminally 
prohibited, even if its purpose is to remedy an unjust status quo. Aggression 
extends that fundamental principle to the interstate context.
130
 
Viewing aggression in this way spotlights why it is its own crime. The oth-
er provisions described above prohibit rebels’ killing of civilians and combat-
ants; they prohibit a state’s forces from killing civilians or groups yet to form a 
lethal rebellious threat; and they prohibit nondefensive killing outside of 
armed conﬂict. What no provision other than the crime of aggression prohibits 
is a state’s forces’ unjustiﬁed killing of a foreign states’ combatants and collat-
eral civilians. In the absence of a crime of aggression, the unjustiﬁed inﬂiction 
of death and suffering in such interstate contexts would have been the norma-
tive anomaly in which such harms could be inﬂicted without any prospect of 
criminal liability. Aggression ﬁlls a crucial gap, providing otherwise missing 
 
Death Penalty in All Circumstances, 2002, C.E.T.S. NO. 187; U.N. Secretary-General, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. 
A/67/275 (Aug. 9, 2012). 
130. Jackson Opening Statement at Nuremberg, supra note 22, at 149 (“[W]hatever grievances a na-
tion may have, however objectionable it ﬁnds the status quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal 
means for settling those grievances or for altering those conditions.”). 
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criminal law protection to the right to life of combatants and collateral civil-
ians.
131
 
The third aspect of the unjustiﬁed killing account’s explanatory superiority 
is that at least one type of criminally aggressive war involves the inﬂiction of 
human violence, but no violation of sovereign rights. Article 8 bis includes as a 
category of criminal war alternative to uses of armed force “against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State,” the “use 
of armed force by a State . . . in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations.”
132
 As in the U.N. Charter, the more speciﬁc categories 
serve as points of emphasis.
133
 However, for the broader category of armed 
force used “in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter” to make sense, 
it must include wrongful wars that do not infringe another state’s “sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence.” 
One obvious example of a use of force ﬁtting that description would be a 
war waged by a state in its own territory against a U.N.-authorized force de-
ployed to prevent the host state from engaging in atrocities. A recent example 
was the use of force by Libya in its own territory against the U.N.-authorized 
North American Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition in 2011.
134
 
In that particular war, NATO engaged only aerially and suffered little dam-
age and zero casualties, so the Libyan action against NATO would almost cer-
tainly not surpass the character, gravity, and scale threshold requirements of 
Article 8 bis (1).
135
 However, for the reasons outlined below, the little force that 
Libya did muster was plainly “inconsistent with” the U.N. Charter, as required 
by 8 bis (2). Counterfactually, had Libya caused sufficient NATO casualties to 
exceed the 8 bis (1) threshold, its action in doing so would have been criminal 
aggression. Because the conﬂict took place exclusively within universally rec-
ognized Libyan territory and the subject of dispute was Libyan domestic policy, 
 
131. See supra note 129; infra note 183. As the “supreme crime,” it is perhaps ﬁtting that aggres-
sion protects the right of life, or what is sometimes termed the “most fundamental human 
right, or the supreme right.” HOUSE OF LORDS HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 111, ¶ 3.56. 
132. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (2). 
133. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 267 (1963); DIN-
STEIN, supra note 91, at 89-90. 
134. On the authorization, see S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). On Libyan force against the NATO 
intervention, see, for example, U.S. Navy Drone Missing over Libya Was “Shot Down”  
by Gaddaﬁ’s Forces, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art 
icle-2023069/U-S-Navy-drone-missing-Libya-shot-Gaddaﬁs-forces.html [http://perma.cc
/V2TQ-Y9UV]. 
135. See infra Section V.A (discussing why bloodless invasions should not count as criminally ag-
gressive). 
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this is explicable only in light of the lack of justiﬁcation for the violence against 
coalition troops, not in light of any infringement of sovereignty. 
The inconsistency of such action with the U.N. Charter is established by 
three elements. First, the Charter prohibits states from using force in their “in-
ternational relations”—including on their own territory—in any way contrary 
to the Charter’s “purposes.”
136
 Interactions between a host state like Libya and 
a U.N.-authorized force clearly fall in the category of international relations, 
and the furtherance of the Security Council’s work under Chapter VII is clearly 
a U.N. purpose.
137
 Second, the only exception to the Charter’s prohibition on 
the use of force (other than acting pursuant to a Security Council authoriza-
tion) is self-defense. Under Article 51 of the Charter, however, self-defense ap-
plies only “until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security” and self-defensive measures “shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council” 
to act under Chapter VII.
138
 Third, the authorization of forces to prevent do-
mestic atrocity is now widely recognized as part of the Security Council’s au-
thority, and indeed responsibility, under Chapter VII, as part of its activity in 
maintaining international peace and security.
139
 As such, it overrides any affect-
ed state’s right of self-defense. 
 
136. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. For a discussion of Article 2(4)’s applicability and relevant examples 
of state practice and legal opinion, see Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries 
of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 
AM. J. INT’L L. 159, 180-88, 209 (2014). For an argument that Georgia’s use of force against 
Russian troops in South Ossetia (Georgian territory) was an illegal armed attack triggering 
a Russian right to use force in self-defense (a right that Russia exceeded in its response), see 
1 INDEP. INT’L FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEOR., REPORT 23-25 (2009). See 
also ILA USE OF FORCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 107, § A.2 (concluding that the U.N. 
Charter prohibition was meant to be an “all-inclusive” ban on the use of force in interna-
tional relations, with “no loopholes”). For a contrary view, see Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, Pro-
hibition of, in 10 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 607, 612 (2012), 
which argues that “to come under the prohibition, the use of armed force by a State must be 
directed against the territory of another State.”  
137. See U.N. Charter art. 1 ¶ 1; id. arts. 24-25, 39. 
138. Id. art. 51; ILA USE OF FORCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 107, § B.2 (interpreting Article 51 to 
mean that a state’s right to use force in self-defense ceases when the Security Council steps 
in). 
139. The interpretation of internal human rights abuses as threats to international peace and se-
curity capable of triggering Chapter VII is long established. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 418 (Nov. 4, 
1977); S.C. Res. 181 (Aug. 7, 1963). The 2011 authorization to use force in Libya rested on 
the internal atrocities and anticipated atrocities of the Gaddaﬁ regime. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 
17, 2011). On the Security Council’s claimed responsibility to authorize such forces, see G.A. 
Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138-39 (Sept. 16, 2005); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 
(Apr. 28, 2006); U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility To Protect 8-9, U.N. 
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The upshot is clear. When states ﬁght back against U.N.-authorized forces 
on their territories, their actions meet the core requirement of Article 8 bis (2). 
As long as the action is of sufficient character, gravity, and scale, it is a criminal 
aggression.
140
 
Thus understood, “aggression” is a term of art; its meaning is deﬁned not 
by which state struck ﬁrst, but by which engaged in an illegal and grave use of 
force.
141
 As the Institut de Droit International resolved in 1971, “the party op-
posing the United Nations Forces has committed aggression,” irrespective of 
whether it acted ﬁrst or crossed a border to do so.
142
 
This deﬁnition bears on the question at hand. Reference to core states’ 
rights cannot explain the criminality of waging war against a U.N.-authorized 
humanitarian intervention force operating exclusively in the attacking state’s 
own territory.
143
 But the criminality of killing U.N. personnel in order to de-
 
Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶¶ 6.13-.28 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]; Anne Pe-
ters, The Security Council’s Responsibility To Protect, 8 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 15 (2011). 
140. Some have argued that, in addition to meeting the chapeau of Article 8 bis (2), an action 
must also fall into one of the examples listed in the ensuing sub-paragraphs (a)-(g). DIN-
STEIN, supra note 91, at 139; Kai Ambos, The Crime of Aggression After Kampala, 53 GERMAN 
Y.B. INT’L L. 463, 487 (2010); Marina Mancini, A Brand New Deﬁnition for the Crime of Ag-
gression: The Kampala Outcome, 81 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 227, 234-35 (2012). Even if this were 
correct, an attack on U.N.-authorized forces within a state’s territory would be an attack on 
“the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air ﬂeets of another State.” Rome Statute, supra 
note 1, art. 8 bis (2)(d). In any event, the dominant view is that the list is illustrative, with 8 
bis (1) and the chapeau of 8 bis (2) sufficient to deﬁne the crime. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special 
Working Grp. on the Crime of Aggression, at 14, I.C.C. Doc. ICC-ASP/6/20/Add.l (2008); 
AM. BRANCH OF THE INT’L LAW ASS’N INT’L CRIMINAL COURT COMM., THE CRIME OF AG-
GRESSION: THE NEW AMENDMENT EXPLAINED, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 6-7 (2011); CARRIE 
MCDOUGALL, THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATION-
AL CRIMINAL COURT 103-05 (2013); Roger S. Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court Considered at the First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 
May-11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 689, 696 (2010); Matthew Gillett, The Anatomy 
of an International Crime: Aggression at the International Criminal Court, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
829, 844-45 (2013); Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the 
Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1191 (2010); Astrid Reisinger, Deﬁning the 
Crime of Aggression, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 425, 440 
(Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., 2010). 
141. DINSTEIN, supra note 91, at 140 (noting that the criminal aggressor need not have opened 
ﬁre). 
142. INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, CONDITIONS OF APPLICATION OF HUMANITARIAN RULES 
OF ARMED CONFLICT TO HOSTILITIES IN WHICH UNITED NATIONS FORCES MAY BE ENGAGED 
art. 7 (1971). 
143. In defense of the traditional account of aggression, one might argue that an attack on the 
U.N.-authorized troops would be a violation of those troops’ states’ rights. Cf. Ruys, supra 
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fend an ongoing atrocity can be explained with reference to killing and inﬂict-
ing human suffering without justiﬁcation. 
Of course, humanitarian intervention without Security Council authoriza-
tion is generally thought to be illegal. The notion that ﬁghting against a hu-
manitarian intervention within one’s own borders could itself be criminal 
therefore applies most plausibly only when the intervention has Security Coun-
cil backing.
144
 Nonetheless, even if limited to that scenario, this argument fur-
ther supports an account of aggression as a crime rooted in wrongful killing, 
not the severe violation of states’ rights. The special case of unauthorized hu-
manitarian interventions is addressed in Parts IV and V. 
For each of the reasons discussed in this Section, the nondefensive killing in 
an illegal war is why waging such a war is criminal. This explanation best ac-
counts for why the state’s right to protect itself from armed attack survived Nu-
remberg and the U.N. Charter, whereas its right to use force to vindicate each 
of its other legal rights was discarded comprehensively. It is consistent with the 
criminalization of unjustiﬁed killing more generally. And it is what clariﬁes 
why using force against an invading U.N.-authorized humanitarian interven-
tion would itself involve waging a criminally aggressive war. 
C. The Humanization of International Law 
An additional virtue of the unjustiﬁed killing account is that it reconciles 
the criminalization of aggression to the broader normative context. In recent 
decades, the very foundations of international law have shifted away from a re-
gime rooted exclusively in state sovereignty and toward a regime that privileges 
human rights and human values—a transformation often termed the “humani-
zation” of international law.
145
 This phenomenon is most explicit in the con-
 
note 136, at 180. However, this would require articulating the relevant sovereign rights in a 
way that renders them either derivative of the human cost of the attack or detached from 
what Walzerian and related accounts have in mind. See supra Part II. 
144. On the legal status of humanitarian intervention, see infra notes 215-216 and accompanying 
text. 
145. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2-10 (1990); THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 27 (2011); Yoram Dinstein, 
The Interaction of International Law and Justice, 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 9, 41-42 (1986); Tom 
Farer, Remarks on “Bombing for Peace: Collateral Damage and Human Rights,” 96 PROC. ANN. 
MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 104, 106 (2002); W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, 
Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 
(1990); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Ra-
ther than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982); see also Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and 
International Law: Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New In-
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temporary notion that sovereignty is at some level conditional on the state dis-
charging its “responsibility to protect” the basic human rights of those within 
its control.
146
 The account presented here identiﬁes the initial criminalization 
of aggression as an early step in this trajectory and makes sense of its ongoing 
customary criminality and its incorporation into the Rome Statute in the more 
deeply humanized contemporary international legal context. 
The humanization process has been especially prominent and consequential 
in international criminal law. At the vanguard of that regime’s revival, the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) wasted no 
time in framing its interpretive approach in precisely such terms, reasoning 
that “[a] State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted 
by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law 
hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the beneﬁt of hu-
man beings) has gained a ﬁrm foothold in the international community as 
well.”
147
 
This notion is manifest throughout the framework of international criminal 
law. Crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide focus on the most se-
 
ternational Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 5-6, 10-16 (2000) (identifying the trend, but also pick-
ing out some of the challenges associated with it); Madeleine K. Albright, Opinion, The End 
of Intervention, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/opinion
/11albright.html [http://perma.cc/MN58-ZWMD] (noting the debate between those sup-
porting and those opposing this shift as a debate rooted in two opposed perspectives: that 
international law is a “living framework of rules intended to make the world a more humane 
place,” or that it is merely “a collection of legal nuts and bolts cobbled together by govern-
ments to protect governments”). 
146. ICISS REPORT, supra note 139, ¶¶ 1.3, 2.14-.15, 2.30-.32; U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges & Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶¶ 29-30, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004); see also Carsten Stahn, Responsibility To Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 118 (2007) (“The core tenet of the concept 
(sovereignty entails responsibility) enjoys broad support among states, and in the United 
Nations and civil society.”); Koﬁ Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST 49-50 
(Sept. 16, 1999), http://www.economist.com/node/324795 [http://perma.cc/3N9C-Z9UG] 
(“States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and 
not vice versa.”); Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Jan./Feb. 2004), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2004-01-01/duty-prevent [http://
perma.cc/KE8K-A4RB] (describing R2P as “nothing less than the redeﬁnition of sovereign-
ty itself”). 
147. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Ap-
peal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [http://perma.cc/4C98-SP5E]. The Tribu-
nal later insisted that human dignity had “become of such paramount importance as to per-
meate the whole body of international law.” Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-
T, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
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vere harms to human beings.
148
 The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC selects 
cases with a view to surpassing the gravity threshold for admissibility based on 
the severity of the human harms they involve.
149
 And, in perhaps the most ob-
vious privileging of humanity over sovereignty, international criminal law re-
quires subjects to disobey domestically authoritative sovereign commands in 
order to protect other human beings.
150
 
The traditional account suggests that the criminalization of aggression is in 
tension with, or even opposition to, this “humanization,” and thus with inter-
national criminal law itself.
151
 The account presented here, by contrast, locates 
aggression at the heart of that process.
152
 Criminalizing aggression constrains 
the sovereign’s previously unlimited authority to vindicate its rights with force, 
preserving that authority only when necessary to protect human beings from 
the illegal inﬂiction of violence or to respond to the illegal threat of such hu-
man violence.
153
 Seen in this light, the classiﬁcation of aggression (and no oth-
er sovereignty violation) alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes makes sense. 
 
148. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6-8; cf. supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing 
how mass crimes, like genocide, also have an individual impact). 
149. See Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, INT’L CRIM. CT., ¶¶ 
61, 63 (Nov. 2013), http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/OTP_-_Policy_Paper
_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/2DGA-9D7Q]; see also Rome 
Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d) (providing the gravity threshold). 
150. E.g., IMT Charter, supra note 2, art. 8; Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 2, art. 
II(4)(b); IMFTE Statute, supra note 2, art. 6; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 33(1); IMT 
Judgment, supra note 2, at 466, 470 (discussing the duty to disobey domestic laws that violate 
international laws and providing examples of those international laws that unambiguously 
protect human beings); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(4), Jan. 16, 2002, 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf [http://perma.cc/DX4E-9UAJ]; S.C. 
Res. 955, annex, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(4) (Nov. 8, 1994); 
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(4), 
May 25, 1993, http://www.icty.org/x/ﬁle/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/CCC3-TTZ5]; 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG TRI-
BUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 470-88 (1949); 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKA-
ERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 551-55, 
563-67 (2009). 
151. See supra notes 8-10, 70-78 and accompanying text. 
152. In more recent work, Luban seems to have sympathy for something similar to this account, 
writing that “[t]he decision to ban the use of force except in self-defense represented a 
judgment, emerging from the smoldering ruins of Europe and Japan, that treating war as an 
instrument of policy poses an intolerable threat to ‘fundamental human rights’ and ‘the dig-
nity and worth of the human person.’” Luban, supra note 48, at 218. 
153. See supra Section III.A; supra notes 114-121, 132-144 and accompanying text; infra notes 205-
214 and accompanying text. 
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A legal regime’s core claim to normativity is strengthened when it coheres 
internally.
154
 The traditional account renders international criminal law “equiv-
ocal” and self-undermining—simultaneously a major step forward in human 
rights and “a major moral enemy of the human rights movement.”
155
 This ten-
sion weighs heavily against it. Conversely, on the unjustiﬁed killing account, 
aggression is of a normative piece with the rest of international criminal law, 
and is an important element of the human rights movement. This militates 
powerfully in its favor. Therefore, even if, contrary to the arguments in Sec-
tions III.A and III.B, the traditional account and the unjustiﬁed killing account 
offered equally plausible explanations of the crime, the latter would still be the 
better normative account. 
D. Revisiting the History of the Move to a Restrictive Jus Ad Bellum 
This focus on the human being is not merely a matter of internal normative 
logic. It has historical plausibility as part of the regime’s purpose. Following the 
devastation of World War I, human life was the overriding public concern of 
those who led the intellectual and political movement that ultimately produced 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact—the key legal hook for the aggression convictions at 
Nuremberg.
156
 
In his 1921 pamphlet laying the foundations for this transition, Levinson 
described war as “inhuman” and compared legal toleration of the practice to 
the toleration of dueling, which had since become “plain murder under our 
laws.”
157
 Levinson recognized that the ban would require states to forswear the 
sovereign authority to vindicate their rights through the “legal device of vio-
lence.”
 158
 Rather than bolstering this argument with a claim that sovereignty 
would also be augmented by the ban on interstate armed attacks, he insisted 
that the longstanding maximalist vision of sovereign authority was no longer 
tenable, given its inﬂiction of “the worst form of violence and crime existing 
among men.”
159
 Colonel Raymond Robins, a fellow proponent of the outlawry 
 
154. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
155. LUBAN, supra note 70, at 341; see supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
156. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 460-66. 
157. LEVINSON, supra note 21, at 14, 16. On Levinson’s signiﬁcance in the movement to ban war, 
see sources cited supra note 21. 
158. LEVINSON, supra note 21, at 18. 
159. Id. at 23. 
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of war, wrote of the movement as an effort to “declare[] [war] in international 
law to be what it is in fact, the supreme enemy of the human race.”
160
 
Leading political ﬁgures also adopted this framing. President Harding 
spoke of the move toward a restrictive jus ad bellum as the call “of humanity 
crying for relief.”
161
 Former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George reﬂect-
ed in his memoirs on the growing sense in this period that war was a “crime 
against humanity” the “perpetrators and instigators” of which ought to be pun-
ished.
162
 Secretary of State Kellogg wrote to the French Ambassador in the 
months before the Pact’s conclusion, “From the broad standpoint of humanity 
and civilization, all war is an assault upon the stability of human society, and 
should be suppressed in the common interest.”
163
 Following the Pact, and with 
the carnage of World War I still fresh in memory, he described war as an “as-
sault on human existence” and noted that the ﬁrst thought in eliminating it 
was “the millions of wounded and dead” that result from armed conﬂict.
164
 
The various efforts to ban the use of force reached their ﬁrst global legal 
fruition in 1928 in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Notably, the treaty’s preamble em-
phasized not sovereignty, but states’ “solemn duty to promote the welfare of 
mankind” through the “humane endeavor” of ending war.
165
 Picking up on this 
idea, Ruti Teitel has described the Pact as a treaty whose focus on humanity 
forged a “connection . . . between the two historical strands of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello (humanitarian law).”
166
 
None of this is to say that there would not be sovereignty beneﬁts to ban-
ning aggressive war. Nor is it to say that these beneﬁts were unrecognized by 
those involved in the drafting of the Pact. But those sovereignty beneﬁts (ex-
changed for sovereignty sacriﬁces) were not the focus of the public reasons giv-
en for this very fundamental legal restructuring. Instead, the focus was on the 
 
160. Robins, supra note 21, at 10. 
161. President Warren Harding, Keynote Conference Address (Nov. 12, 1921), quoted in LEVIN-
SON, supra note 21, at 5. 
162. 1 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 55 (1939). 
163. Letter from Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Paul Claudel, Ambassador of Fr. (Feb. 
27, 1928), reprinted in DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE PEACE PACT OF PARIS: A STUDY OF THE 
BRIAND-KELLOGG TREATY 174, 176 (1928). 
164. Kellogg, supra note 99. 
165. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 20, pmbl. 
166. TEITEL, supra note 145, at 27. Presaging this line of thought, Francis Lieber—a key ﬁgure in 
the development of the contemporary jus in bello—emphasized that it is the human suffering 
of war that animates jus ad bellum requirements of justiﬁcation and necessity. 2 FRANCIS 
LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS, DESIGNED CHIEFLY FOR THE USE OF COLLEGES AND 
STUDENTS AT LAW 635 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839). 
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human wrongs inﬂicted by those who initiate war without justiﬁcation. If any-
thing, advocates of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, including Kellogg himself, were 
forced to defend it against the charge that it ceded too much in the way of sov-
ereign authority.
167
 
E. Aggression and the Human Dimension in the Courtroom 
This focus on the unjustiﬁed inﬂiction of death and human suffering as the 
normative core of the issue was also palpable at Nuremberg and at Tokyo. Jus-
tice Jackson, the lead American prosecutor at the IMT, argued, “[W]hat ap-
peals to men of good will and common sense as the crime which comprehends 
all lesser crimes, is the crime of making unjustiﬁable war. War necessarily is a 
calculated series of killings, of destructions of property, of oppressions.”
168
 In 
his retrospective on the trials, Jackson’s Nuremberg colleague, Whitney Harris, 
adopted a similar line, reasoning: 
Hitler ordered the killing of men called to the defense of countries 
which German armies invaded at Hitler’s command. Insofar as these 
invasions were acts of pure aggression, and wholly without legal justiﬁ-
cation, the resultant killings offended the conscience of mankind just as 
the slaughter of persons in concentration camps offended universal 
conscience. . . . The killing of innocent human beings by order of heads 
of states is subject to substantially the same moral blame whether it is 
the killing of civilian populations in connection with war or the killing 
of troops resisting unlawful aggression. . . . It is not the fact of initiating 
and waging aggressive war which reprehends it, but that it is necessari-
ly a course of killings and of brutality which is attained in no other rela-
tionship of man or nation.
169
 
Nuremberg prosecutor and subsequent University of Chicago law professor 
Bernard Meltzer argued that “the Kellogg-Briand Pact and similar agreements 
are important, not because they directly made aggressive war a crime, but be-
cause, by destroying it as a defense, they made the instigators of aggression 
 
167. See, e.g., Hearings on the General Pact for the Renunciation of War, Signed at Paris August 27, 
1928 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 70th Cong. (1928) (statement of Frank B. Kel-
logg, Sec’y of State of the United States). 
168. Robert H. Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International 
Conference on Military Trials, DEP’T ST.,  51 (1949), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law
/pdf/jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf [http://perma.cc/2HDC-TFX9]. 
169. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 528-29. 
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subject to the universal laws against murder.”
170
 Hartley Shawcross, the chief 
British prosecutor at the IMT, brought this framing into the courtroom, em-
phasizing in his closing statement that “where a war is illegal . . . there is noth-
ing to justify the killing, and these murders are not to be distinguished from 
those of any other lawless robber bands.”
171
 
These were not mere prosecutorial ﬂourishes. The IMT judgment de-
scribed aggression as “the supreme international crime differing only from oth-
er war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the 
whole.”
172
 Similarly, the NMT described aggression as the “pinnacle of crimi-
nality” due to its inﬂiction of “horror, suffering, and loss.”
173
 The wrong the 
tribunals recognized in these statements is not the macro violation of sover-
eignty, but the aggregation of harms that that macro policy entails.
174
 It is the 
death and destruction internal to aggression that is evil, and it is the accumula-
tion of that evil that warrants criminalizing the war.
175
 
The IMTFE was more direct, holding that waging illegal war is the gravest 
crime because it entails “that death and suffering will be inﬂicted on countless 
human beings.”
176
 Going even further than their IMT counterparts, the prose-
cutors in Tokyo had supplemented the charge of waging aggressive war with 
the charge of murder as a crime against the peace, including in the latter the 
killings of enemy soldiers in the course of an illegal invasion.
177
 The Tribunal 
 
170. Bernard D. Meltzer, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 
460-61 (1947). 
171. Closing Statement at the Nuremberg Trials (July 26, 1946) by Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor 
for the U.K., in 19 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 458 (1948); see also Thomas Weigend, “In General a Principle of Justice”: The 
Debate on the “Crime Against Peace” in the Wake of the Nuremberg Judgment, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 41, 50 (2012) (“[I]f war as such had been declared to be illegal, then the killing, 
wounding and destruction incident to any war lost its legal protection . . . .”). 
172. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 427 (emphasis added); see also id. at 465 (citing favorably the 
Resolution of the Sixth Pan-American Conference’s declaration that a “war of aggression 
constitutes an international crime against the human species”). 
173. Ministries Case, supra note 2, at 342; see also id. at 318-19, 333 (describing the atrocities and 
horror inherent to war). 
174. For an author who understands “accumulated evil” in this way, see DINSTEIN, supra note 91, 
at 128. 
175. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, The Crime of Aggression: A Further Infor-
mal Discussion Paper, UNITED NATIONS ¶ 10 (Nov. 13, 2000), http://documents-dds 
-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/742/89/PDF/N0074289.pdf [http://perma.cc/VVQ7 
-47AA] (emphasizing the death and destruction that make aggression of global concern). 
176. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 2, at 49,769. 
177. Id. at 48,452. 
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adopted this reasoning, declining to consider the murder charge only because it 
was deemed redundant to the charge of waging aggressive war. Speciﬁcally, the 
IMFTE held: 
If, in any case, the ﬁnding be that the war was not unlawful then the 
charge of murder will fall with the charge of waging unlawful war. If, 
on the other hand, the war, in any particular case, is held to have been 
unlawful, then this involves unlawful killings . . . at all places in the theater 
of war and at all times throughout the period of the war. No good purpose 
is to be served, in our view, in dealing with these parts of the offences 
by way of counts for murder when the whole offence of waging those 
wars unlawfully is put in issue upon the counts charging the waging of 
such wars.
178
 
More recently, a committee reporting to the ICTY on NATO’s aerial cam-
paign against Yugoslavia in 1999 found that “a person convicted of a crime 
against peace may, potentially, be held criminally responsible for all of the ac-
tivities causing death, injury or destruction during a conﬂict.”
179
 Similarly, Brit-
ish Attorney General Lord Peter Goldsmith warned Prime Minister Tony Blair 
of the outside possibility that he could be charged with murder for killings by 
British soldiers in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, should the war be deemed ille-
gal.
180
 Meanwhile, Security Council condemnations of aggressions since World 
War II have expressed concern and indignation not only at the infringement of 
sovereignty, but also at the killing and human suffering entailed.
181
 
 
178. Id. at 48,452-53 (emphasis added); see also id. at 49,576. 
179. Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Com-
mittee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, UNITED NATIONS ¶ 30 (2000), http://www.icty.org/x/ﬁle/Press/nato061300.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LQY6-NBKY]. 
180. Memorandum from Peter Goldsmith, Att’y Gen., U.K. Att’y Gen.’s Office, to Tony Blair, 
Prime Minister, U.K. Prime Minister’s Office ¶ 34 (Mar. 7, 2003) (on ﬁle with author). 
181. See S.C. Res. 611, pmbl. (Apr. 25, 1988); S.C. Res. 580, pmbl., ¶¶ 1-2 (Dec. 30, 1985); S.C. 
Res. 573, ¶ 4 (Oct. 4, 1985); S.C. Res. 571, pmbl. (Sept. 20, 1985); S.C. Res. 568, pmbl. 
(June 21, 1985);. S.C. Res. 546, pmbl. (Jan. 6, 1984); S.C. Res. 455, pmbl. (Nov. 23, 1979); 
S.C. Res. 424, pmbl. (Mar. 17, 1978); S.C. Res. 411, pmbl. (June 30, 1977); S.C. Res. 405, 
pmbl. (Apr. 14, 1977); S.C. Res. 326, pmbl. (Feb. 2, 1973). But see S.C. Res. 387 (Mar. 31, 
1976). 
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F. The Wrong of Aggressive War 
For the reasons provided in this Part, an account of aggression that locates 
its core wrong in unjustiﬁed killing better fulﬁlls the three criteria of a good 
normative account of the law than does an approach that focuses instead on the 
harm to sovereignty. 
First, identifying the wrong as the unjustiﬁed killing in an aggressive war 
explains the legal contours of the crime in a way that a focus on sovereignty or 
even self-determination cannot. The jus ad bellum restrains the sovereign capac-
ity to vindicate legal rights using force as much as it protects the sovereign 
rights to territorial integrity, political independence, and self-determination. 
Moreover, nonbelligerent acts that more severely infringe territorial integrity, 
political independence, or self-determination than does aggressive war are not 
criminal. Conversely, other forms of unjustiﬁed killing are criminalized in some 
other form. And illegal uses of interstate force that involve no sovereignty vio-
lation, or that vindicate territorial integrity or political independence rights 
without responding to an armed attack, are criminal aggressions. In each of 
these respects, neither sovereignty nor self-determination can make sense of 
the jus ad bellum and its role in international criminal law. In contrast, a focus 
on killing and human suffering is illuminating. Were it not criminal, aggressive 
war would be the key form in which such harms are inﬂicted on a massive scale 
without either being justiﬁed as a necessary and proportionate response to the 
threat or inﬂiction of such harms by another, or being criminalized in some 
other way. 
Second, the humanity-based explanation of aggression comports better 
with the overall purpose of the law in this domain, aligning both with the mo-
tivations for the initial outlawry of war and with the overall purposes of inter-
national criminal law as a key dimension of the “humanization” of international 
law. A connection between the killings in aggressive war and the wrong of 
murder ran through the heart of the prosecutions and convictions at Nurem-
berg and Tokyo, and has been reiterated in the work of several legal authorities 
since. 
Third, a normative account rooted in humanity coheres with adjacent legal 
rules: explaining why aggression is the only criminal sovereignty violation and 
accounting for aggression’s ﬁt within the broader legal approach to the unjusti-
ﬁed inﬂiction of human suffering. By contrast, as Luban and others emphasize, 
a crime that privileges sovereignty over humanity would sit extremely uneasi-
ly—and possibly in conﬂict—with the general humanizing posture of interna-
why have we criminalized aggressive war? 
1287 
tional criminal law and the noncriminal status of all other sovereignty viola-
tions.
182
 
Aggression typically involves a sovereignty violation, but it is fundamental-
ly a crime against human beings. It is a “law that has as its purpose protecting 
the fundamental right to life of millions of people.”
183
 What makes it special in 
international criminal law is not that it protects sovereignty, rather than hu-
manity, but that it alone protects the right to life of combatants and propor-
tionate collateral civilians against the wrongful violence of foreign states. 
iv. two problem cases: bloodless aggression and 
humanitarian intervention 
Before introducing the doctrinal implications of this normative reconceptu-
alization, two potential problem cases should be addressed: bloodless invasion 
and humanitarian intervention. A “bloodless invasion” is an illegal military tak-
ing of territory or usurpation of governmental power without the inﬂiction of 
casualties. Such actions are, by deﬁnition, unlawful. Although the legal status 
of humanitarian interventions lacking Security Council authorization is con-
tested, the dominant view is that they, too, are unlawful. As illegal uses of 
force, a case can be made that both actions are also criminal. 
The putative problem is this. Both actions involve a clear infringement of 
sovereignty. But neither appears to ﬁt the unjustiﬁed killing paradigm. Blood-
less invasions involve no killing at all, and the killing in a humanitarian inter-
vention is responsive to the illegal human violence and killing of an atrocity 
crime in much the same way as the killing in a defensive war responds to the 
unjustiﬁed killing of an armed attack. Therefore, if such actions are criminal, 
the moral explanation would seem to be rooted not in human life, but in state 
sovereignty. Or so the objection would go. 
This Part rebuts that concern. The criminal status of bloodless invasion at 
Nuremberg was dubious and marginal, and little has occurred to change this 
reality since. Indeed, there is space in Article 8 bis to exclude bloodless invasion 
from the crime altogether. This is telling, because if the sovereignty-focused, 
traditional account were true, bloodless invasions ought to be the paradigmatic 
example of the crime. The fact that they are not militates strongly against the 
traditional account. Moreover, the reason bloodless invasions are even poten-
 
182. See supra notes 8-10, 70-78, 153 and accompanying text. 
183. Mary Ellen O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What is Aggression? Comparing the Jus Ad 
Bellum and the ICC Statute, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 189, 192 (2012); see supra notes 129, 131 
and accompanying text. 
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tially criminal under current law is rooted not in their impact on sovereignty, 
but in their latent killing. This is what underpinned the limited criminal status 
of bloodless invasions at Nuremberg and it is what distinguishes bloodless in-
vasion from the noncriminal sovereignty violations discussed in Section III.A. 
Thus, if bloodless invasions are criminal, the reason why would only serve to 
add further support to the unjustiﬁed killing account. 
The humanitarian intervention objection is weaker. There is no precedent 
for the prosecution of a leader of such an action and the contemporary illegality 
of such interventions is most plausibly rooted not in the principle that such 
wars infringe sovereignty, but in the worry that legalization would encourage 
wars waged on a humanitarian pretext, and thus unjustiﬁed killing. Here too 
there is both interpretive space and good reason to exclude humanitarian inter-
vention from the crime. Even if it were to be included, it would be with refer-
ence to encouraging unjustiﬁed killing. 
A. Bloodless Invasion 
Under the pending Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute, a war is criminal when 
it infringes the “territorial integrity or political independence” of a state.
184
 Ro-
din argues that “this condition is both logically and factually independent of 
the question of whether the lives of individual citizens within the state are 
threatened.”
185
 Rodin here invokes the specter of so-called “bloodless,” or at 
least near-bloodless, aggression.
186
 
The category is far from a null set. Most would recognize Russia’s 2014 in-
vasion and annexation of Crimea as a prominent recent example. Following the 
Maidan protests, the ﬂight and de facto abdication of President Yanukovych, 
and the pro-European takeover in Kiev in late February 2014, Russia took deci-
sive military and paramilitary action in Crimea, purportedly to protect Russian 
nationals in the autonomous region.
187
 Far exceeding the terms of a 1997 
 
184. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (2). 
185. RODIN, supra note 53, at 132. Rodin’s focus is on self-defense, not the crime of aggression. 
However, his point is to emphasize the signiﬁcance of bloodless aggression in illuminating 
what is at stake in the legal jus ad bellum, and the language he focuses on (territorial integrity 
and political independence) is anyway common to the bans on the use of force and aggres-
sion, not the “armed attack” rule that triggers a right to self-defense. Cf. U.N. Charter art. 2 
¶ 4; id. art. 51; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (2). 
186. RODIN, supra note 53, at 132. 
187. For useful overviews of the events in Ukraine and the subsequent reactions, see Olivier Cor-
ten, The Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Crisis: Was Jus Contra Bellum “Conﬁrmed Ra-
ther than Weakened”?, 2 J. USE FORCE & INT’L L. 17 (2015); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis 
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agreement with Ukraine regarding Russian troops’ presence, the deployment 
enabled the armed takeover of the regional parliament, public buildings, and 
infrastructure.
188
 In a hastily arranged referendum, conducted under the shad-
ow of that dominant military presence, Crimeans voted to secede from Ukraine 
and to accede to Russia, paving the way for further troop deployments and a 
full annexation. Moscow now claims Crimea as its own, near-global nonrecog-
nition of the transfer notwithstanding.
189
 Most important for the discussion 
here, despite the clear impact of Russian military action in effecting the annexa-
tion, there were no signiﬁcant casualties.
190
 
Uses of force such as that in Crimea undermine what Walzer terms the 
“highest values of international society”—namely, “the survival and freedom of 
political communities”—curtailing the political independence and self-
determination rights that he insists “are worth dying for,” even when no one 
actually dies for them.
191
 Even if the attacked state’s central politics are left in-
tact and the population of the annexed region has little objection to their new 
sovereign, the territorial taking anyway violates the other core sovereign value 
protected by the jus ad bellum: territorial integrity.
192
 In short, such invasions 
involve severe and illegal infringements of sovereignty, but no human death or 
 
Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 108 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 784, 784-815 (2014); and Antonello Tancredi, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea: 
Questions Relating to the Use of Force, 1 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 5 (2014). In addition to the claim 
regarding the protection of Russian nationals, Russian representatives asserted the right to 
intervene at the invitation of the ousted Yanukovich and subsequently at the invitation of 
Sergey Aksyonov, who was installed as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea during 
the intervention. See, e.g., Corten, supra, at 18-19; Tancredi, supra, at 10. 
188. See, e.g., Tancredi, supra note 187, at 6, 19-20. 
189. On the coercive context in which the referendum occurred, see Office of the U.N. High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, ¶¶ 6, 83-86 
(Apr. 15, 2014). 
190. Tancredi, supra note 187, at 7-8 (describing the use of “abundant[]” military coercion “even 
without opening ﬁre” and noting that, after denial and obfuscation, Putin eventually admit-
ted that “the Russian servicemen did back the Crimean self-defense forces” and made “a 
substantial, if not the decisive, contribution to enabling the people of Crimea to express their 
will”). 
191. WALZER, supra note 11, at 253-54; see also Luban, supra note 19, at 164 (describing aggres-
sion’s core wrong as “dictatorial interference” by one state in another’s affairs (citing 
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950)). 
192. Thus, McMahan observes, a bloodless invasion—what he terms a “lesser aggression”— “is 
not really lesser according to the traditional theory,” for, despite inﬂicting no immediate 
physical harm on individuals, it “may be lethal, or severely disabling, in its effect on the 
state.”
 
McMahan, supra note 39, at 118 (emphasis added). 
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violence. If they are indeed criminal, this might seem to militate in favor of the 
traditional account and against the unjustiﬁed killing account of aggression. 
In fact, the reverse is true. The criminal status of an illegal invasion that 
takes territory or usurps a foreign state’s government without spilling a drop of 
blood is ambiguous and marginal at best—a point that weighs heavily against 
the traditional sovereignty-focused account. 
Unlike each of its other invasions, Germany’s relatively bloodless annexa-
tions of Austria and Bohemia and Moravia were excluded from the criminal in-
dictment before the IMT, which then distinguished them explicitly from wars 
of aggression in its ﬁnal judgment.
193
 This exclusion is telling. If the core 
wrong of aggression were its infringement of sovereignty or nulliﬁcation of a 
people’s self-determination, bloodless aggression would be the paradigmatic 
form of the crime. Invasions that lack violent military confrontation eviscerate 
the territorial integrity and political independence of the victim states with far 
greater efficacy than do ordinary wars of aggression, many of which are unsuc-
cessful in unseating the target government or holding territory.
194
 The Nazi 
annexations of Austria and Bohemia and Moravia exemplify this perfectly, so 
the point would not have been lost on those at Nuremberg.
195
 
On the traditional normative account, then, it is difficult to make sense of 
either the failure to charge those invasions before the IMT, or of their separate 
normative status in the ﬁnal judgment. On the account presented here, howev-
er, this marginalization makes perfect sense. For, while bloodless invasions are 
no less harmful to political independence and territorial integrity, they lack the 
same human violence as aggressive wars involving conﬂict and casualties. 
Of course, although it was the most signiﬁcant aggression prosecution to 
date, the IMT’s was not the only word on this issue. The NMT subsequently 
adopted a broader deﬁnition of the crime, which included the invasions of Aus-
 
193. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 427; see also UNGA Deﬁnition of Aggression, supra note 3, 
annex art 5(2). 
194. Cf. supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text (contrasting nonviolent violations of territo-
rial integrity with belligerent acts). Compare the decisive impact of Russia’s bloodless an-
nexation of Crimea to the far bloodier war in Donbass, the effects of which have been less 
clear-cut. On the current situation in Donbass, see, for example, Office of the U.N. High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 November 
2015 to 15 February 2016 (Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter OHCHR 2016 Report]. Likewise, were 
it not for the U.N.-authorized intervention, Iraq’s relatively low-casualty 1990 annexation of 
Kuwait would have been far more effective than its bloody and ultimately futile aggressive 
war against Iran in the 1980s. On Iraq’s aggression against Iran, see Further Report of the Sec-
retary-General, supra note 112. 
195. IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 433-36, 573. 
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tria and Bohemia and Moravia.
196
 It is in this sense that the Nuremberg legacy 
on bloodless invasions is ambiguous. 
However, the reasoning for the NMT’s more expansive approach itself 
weighs heavily in favor of the unjustiﬁed killing account. In explaining the in-
clusion of these invasions as criminal aggressions, the NMT emphasized the 
fact that they were achieved against the backdrop of threatened slaughter by an 
overwhelmingly militarily superior Nazi force.
197
 What made these actions 
criminal, the tribunal emphasized in the High Command Case, was “the exert-
ing of violence” by German forces, even though that exertion was met with no 
resistance and thus the latent killing it entailed was not ultimately consummat-
ed.
198
 
Moral theorists critical of the Walzerian approach have started to bring pre-
cisely this notion of latent violence to the fore in related areas of philosophical 
discussion. Thus, as Cécile Fabre argues, a key normative link between blood-
less invasions and traditional aggressions is that the former involve at their core 
“individuals posing a lethal threat, either ongoing or imminent, to other indi-
viduals.”
199
 This is what distinguishes both kinds of invasion from the kind of 
nonbelligerent, and noncriminal, sovereignty infringements discussed 
above.
200
 Whereas the latter violate political independence and territorial integ-
 
196. Control Council Law No. 10 included both illegal “war” and “invasions of other countries,” 
whereas the IMT Charter focused exclusively on illegal “war.” Control Council Law No. 10, 
supra note 2, art. II(1)(a); see IMT Charter, supra note 2, art. 6(a). 
197. The NMT emphasized the Nazis’ use of “overwhelming force” in these actions, noting that 
Germany perpetrated an “act of war” notwithstanding its “ab[ility] to so overawe the invad-
ed countries” that its invasion was relatively bloodless. Ministries Case, supra note 2, at 330-
31. It emphasized that, in such a situation, the attacked population chooses not to ﬁght for 
“fear or a sense of the futility of resistance in the face of superior force . . . and thus prevents 
the occurrence of any actual combat.” High Command Case, supra note 6, at 485. Similarly, 
the IMT held that what made the annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia condemnable 
(though not prosecuted) was that they relied on the threatened use of “the armed might of 
Germany . . . if any resistance was encountered.” IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 435. It found 
that Czech President Emil Hácha submitted only under Hermann Göring’s explicit threat to 
“destroy Prague completely from the air” and having been told by the German delegation 
that their “troops had already received orders to march and that any resistance would be 
broken with physical force.” Id. at 439. This ﬁnding was subsequently cited by the NMT. 
Ministries Case Judgment, supra note 2, at 429. For similar reasoning in Tokyo, see IMTFE 
Judgment, supra note 2, at 49,582a-83, 49,769. 
198. High Command Case, supra note 6, at 485. 
199. Fabre, supra note 106, at 99. Fabre is discussing the trigger for self-defense here, but as with 
Rodin’s comment above, see supra note 185 and accompanying text, the point holds equally 
well for aggression, see infra notes 205-214 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra notes 105, 117 and accompanying text. 
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rity without exerting violence, the former achieve that end by inﬂicting latent 
lethal harm. 
This distinction is crucial. If bloodless invasions are criminal (as the NMT 
suggests they are), the key trait that deﬁnes them as such, just as in the ordi-
nary aggression case, is the means by which sovereignty is violated, not the fact 
or degree of the sovereignty violation. The difference between an aggressive 
military invasion that achieves its sovereignty-infringing end bloodlessly and 
the illegal foreign manipulation of elections is akin to the interpersonal differ-
ence between mugging someone for her wallet with a lethal weapon and pick-
pocketing the same wallet from her without any physical threat.
201
 One inﬂicts 
latent violence; the other does not. If aggression is criminal, its criminality as 
compared to the mere illegality of otherwise similar sovereignty violations 
would parallel armed mugging’s felony status as compared to the misdemeanor 
status of nonviolently stealing the same item.
202
 
How the ICC or domestic criminal courts will approach bloodless invasions 
is unclear. No legal authority has assessed the criminality of such actions since 
World War II. Indeed, the analysis and debate regarding the precise legal status 
of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea has not even considered whether it 
might have been criminal (presumably due to the lack of any viable means of 
prosecution).
203
 Nonetheless, it is notable that in various deliberations on the 
matter at the Security Council and elsewhere, the concept of latent Russian vio-
lence to human life was raised frequently. Those condemning the operation as 
an act of aggression described Crimean voters as acting under “the barrel of a 
gun” and “in the shadow of Russian bayonets.”
204
 If the annexation of Crimea 
was criminal, this feature of the invasion was surely the crucial one. 
Seen in this light, bloodless aggression does not provide a counterexample 
to the humanity-based account of the crime of aggression. On the contrary, in 
combination with the arguments in Part III, it ﬁlls out a context in which that 
is the only viable account of aggression. First, nonviolent but severe infringe-
ments of sovereignty are not criminal. Second, large-scale, lethal uses of inter-
national force not responsive to armed attacks are criminal, even when they 
vindicate the core sovereign rights related to territorial integrity, political inde-
pendence, or self-determination. Third, bloodless invasions that threaten sig-
niﬁcant human harm are at the margin of criminality—of mixed status at Nu-
 
201. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
202. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 222.1, 223.1(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
203. On the legal status of the action in Crimea, see, for example, the sources cited supra note 187. 
No international court holds jurisdiction and domestic prosecution is politically unrealistic. 
204. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7134th mtg. at 8, 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7134 (Mar. 13, 2014). 
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remberg, and, as elaborated in Part V, of dubious criminal status under the ICC 
regime. Fourth, when including such invasions in the crime, NMT judges em-
phasized the latent violence of those actions. 
This analysis deals with the core objection, but before turning to humani-
tarian interventions, it is worth addressing a second dimension of the worry 
about bloodless invasions—namely, that the lawfulness of wars waged defen-
sively against such invasions might be thought to contradict the argument in 
Section III.B that the jus ad bellum allows for the use of force only in response 
to an attack on, or threat to, human life.
205
 This challenge differs from that of 
the purported criminality of bloodless invasions, because the right to self-
defense is triggered not by subjection to criminal aggression, but by subjection 
to an “armed attack”—a distinct and autonomous legal concept.
206
 Nonetheless, 
the crux of the response is the same. 
To warrant defensive force, an invasion must carry the immediate threat of 
lethal force; it must be an armed attack.
207
 A bloodless deployment of border 
officials and national ﬂags to foreign territory would satisfy this criterion no 
better than the kind of electoral manipulation discussed above.
208
 Of course, 
the arrest or eviction of such an unarmed deployment could trigger an (illegal) 
use of armed force on the part of the invading state. Under existing doctrine, 
however, the right to self-defense arises only following the application of such 
force, or at least its certain imminent application, not merely because it may 
loom as the potential mechanism for preserving the effects of an unarmed in-
 
205. RODIN, supra note 53, at 131-32; see supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text (discussing 
the armed attack requirement). The moral difficulty of explaining the justiﬁcation for such 
wars, and the links between the presumption that such wars are justiﬁed and the sovereignty 
focus of the traditional normative account of international law, is examined in THE MORALI-
TY OF DEFENSIVE WAR, supra note 39. 
206. See, e.g., Eri.-Eth. Cl. Comm’n, Decision Number 7: Guidance Regarding Jus Ad Bellum Lia-
bility, ¶ 5 (July 27, 2007). Of course, the ICJ has frequently used the General Assembly’s 
deﬁnition of aggression in its jurisprudence on self-defense. See Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 
27). For an illuminating discussion of how to interpret the ICJ’s jurisprudence on this issue 
in a way that preserves and explains the distinction between “armed attack” and the crime of 
aggression, see Dapo Akande & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The International Court of Justice 
and the Concept of Aggression, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY (Claus Kreß & 
Stefan Barriga eds., forthcoming 2018). 
207. See supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text. 
208. See, e.g., Japanese Police Arrest Hong Kong Activists Who Sailed to Disputed Islands, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 15, 2012, 9:23 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/15/japanese-arrest
-activists-territory-dispute [http://perma.cc/8KGK-4JVA]. 
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tervention.
209
 Moreover, even when the immediate lethal threat to human be-
ings is present, the use of defensive force is lawful only to the extent it is pro-
portionate to the wrongful armed threat to which it responds.
210
 
Just as it is essential to the potentially criminal status of a bloodless inva-
sion, this element of latent violence to human persons is also vital to grounding 
the right to self-defense. Fabre argues, “The crucial question [in this context] is 
not whether sovereignty-rights themselves warrant defending by force; rather, 
it is whether [combatants of the attacked state] are under a duty to surrender 
those rights as a means to save their life and as an alternative to killing” com-
batants of the aggressor state.
211
 She contends that they are under no such duty 
because their rights to defensive force are engaged by the “actual threat of fu-
ture lethal harm.”
212
 Again drawing an analogy to violent mugging, those mak-
ing this moral argument invoke the parallel disparity between the quantum of 
force appropriate in resisting an armed mugger demanding “your money or 
 
209. On the high threshold for triggering the right to self-defense, see, for example, Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 191-95. On distinguishing 
self-defense from counter-measures in this respect, see id. ¶ 210. On the imminence re-
quirement for defense against future attacks, see, for example, D.J. HARRIS, CASES & MATE-
RIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 931-33 (6th ed., 2004); and U.N. High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges & Change, supra note 146, ¶¶ 188-92. 
210. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judg-
ment. 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 1), ¶ 147; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 
¶¶ 43, 51, 73-74, 77 (Nov. 6); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 176, 194; Letter from Daniel Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 
Henry S. Fox, British Minister to the United States (Apr. 24, 1841), http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp [http://perma.cc/AS9B-AN9H]. 
211. Fabre, supra note 106, at 109. 
212. Id. at 111; see also Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
34, 54-55 (2005) (arguing that the lethal threat of a wrongful but potentially bloodless ag-
gressor increases signiﬁcantly the amount of force that may be used in response, even if it 
does not justify the same quantum of force as would an aggression aimed at causing death); 
Jeff McMahan, Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War, 2 J. POL. PHIL. 193, 196 (1994). 
McMahan has since put forward a more equivocal view, due to the number of minimally 
culpable aggressor soldiers that would be killed in such a war. McMahan, supra note 39, at 
146-54. Notably, however, this is a view that would preclude morally the use of defensive 
force in such scenarios altogether, not one that would offer an alternative normative account 
of why such force is lawful. For other arguments along these lines, see Seth Lazar, National 
Defence, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Political Aggression, in THE MORALITY OF DEFENSIVE 
WAR, supra note 39, at 11, 26; and David Rodin, The Myth of National Self-Defence, in THE 
MORALITY OF DEFENSIVE WAR, supra note 39, at 69, 77, 81-85. 
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your life” and that which would be appropriate to prevent a nonviolent attempt 
to steal the same item.
213
 
Only if we understand the right to defensive force as a right that responds 
to the aggressive inﬂiction of latent violence can we explain why bloodless mili-
tary invasions trigger a legal right to the use of defensive force, while the non-
violent infringements of territorial integrity and political independence dis-
cussed in Part III do not.
214
 Here too the status of bloodless invasions coheres 
better with the unjustiﬁed killing account than with the sovereignty-focused, 
traditional account. 
B. Humanitarian Intervention 
The second apparent problem case is that of humanitarian intervention 
lacking Security Council authorization. A small minority of states and other au-
thorities have argued that such interventions can be lawful.
215
 If this is right, 
 
213. Lazar, supra note 212, at 25; see Fabre, supra note 106, at 109-113; Hurka, supra note 212, at 
54-55; McMahan, supra note 212, at 196; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii) (AM. LAW 
INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (allowing the use of deadly force in response to “arson, 
burglary, robbery or other felonious theft or property destruction” only if the perpetrator has 
“employed or threatened deadly force” or “the use of force other than deadly force to prevent 
the commission or the consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his 
presence to substantial danger of serious bodily injury”). Seth Lazar accepts that “[l]ethal 
defence against an aggressor that rolls over the border, promising to kill anyone who resists, 
is probably justiﬁable in individualist terms.” Lazar, supra note 212, at 26. However, he ar-
gues that at least some bloodless aggressors promise instead only to use force if subject to le-
thal defensive force themselves. Id. at 26-27. This misunderstands the language of invasion. 
The overtly armed nature of attacks that trigger the right to self-defense is a threat to kill 
those who pose any form of effective resistance, including enemy soldiers who place them-
selves between the aggressors and their objectives, without themselves ﬁring on the aggres-
sors. See Fabre, supra note 106, at 110. 
214. See supra notes 105-107, 115-121 and accompanying text (discussing why nonviolent in-
fringements of state sovereignty, such as the manipulation of a foreign state’s elections, do 
not give the violated state a right to use defensive force). 
215. The Dutch, Belgian, and U.K. governments have articulated this position at various points. 
See Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, 
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 232, 239-40 
(J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); Robin Cook, Sec’y of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs, Speech to the American Bar Association Meeting in London (July 
19, 2000), reprinted in U.K. Materials on International Law, 71 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 646 (2000); 
Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position, PRIME MINISTER’S 
OFFICE, 10 DOWNING ST. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.gov.uk/government/publications
/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon 
-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version [http://perma.cc/BFJ9
-9EXF]. Shortly after stepping down as U.S. State Department legal adviser, Harold Koh 
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humanitarian intervention poses no difficulty for the account presented here. 
However, most experts and states reject that position.
216
 If the latter view is 
correct, unauthorized humanitarian intervention might be thought to pose a 
difficulty for the unjustiﬁed killing account. Without taking a view on the le-
gality of humanitarian intervention, the following discussion assumes such ac-
tions to be illegal for the sake of argument. 
The putative difficulty posed by the presumed illegality of humanitarian in-
tervention is as follows. Article 8 bis criminalizes all “manifest violation[s]” of 
the U.N. Charter’s rules on the use of force, as deﬁned by their “character, 
gravity and scale.”
217
 Efforts during the amendment process to attach an explic-
it understanding excluding humanitarian intervention from the crime failed.
218
 
As such, the argument goes, manifestly illegal humanitarian interventions are 
necessarily criminal.
219
 The problem is that genuine and proportionate human-
itarian interventions use lethal violence only to defend against criminally 
wrongful killing and violence.
220
 In other words, they lack the wrong of aggres-
sion deﬁned above—namely, the inﬂiction of death and violence that is not jus-
tiﬁed by its response to the threat or inﬂiction of the same.
221
 
 
insisted that such interventions are at least arguably lawful. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria 
and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), 
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2 
[http://perma.cc/SV9P-LT84]. 
216. Koh admits that “[a]mong international legal commentators, the emerging party line seems 
to be that President Obama was threatening blatantly illegal military action in Syria . . . .” 
Koh, supra note 215; see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 
47, 51 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that many states have stated that they regard humanitarian in-
tervention to be illegal); Debate Map: Use of Force Against Syria, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L.  
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate_map_syria/debate-map-use-of-force 
-against-syria [http://perma.cc/YPS9-FZT6]. 
217. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (1). 
218. Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian Intervention on Behalf of Wom-
en, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 477, 482-83 (2011). It is notable also that the preamble to the 
Rome Statute reaffirms the U.N. Charter’s posture on the use of force and notes in that re-
gard that “nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene 
in . . . the internal affairs of any State.” Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶¶ 7-8. 
219. See Sean D. Murphy, Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 341 
(2009) (elaborating on the line of interpretation that would include humanitarian interven-
tions as criminal, but predicting that a prosecution on these grounds is unlikely); Van 
Schaack, supra note 218 (recognizing the possibility of an interpretation that would include 
humanitarian interventions as criminal, but arguing against it on feminist grounds). 
220. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 139, ¶ 139; S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 139, ¶ 4; ICISS RE-
PORT, supra note 139, ¶¶ 4.13, 4.19-4.26. 
221. See supra Section III.B; supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text (explaining the basic con-
sistency of this principle across crimes, notwithstanding different thresholds of criminality). 
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To be clear, humanitarian interventions do involve killing in an illegal ac-
tion. In other words, they do involve legally unjustiﬁed killing.
222
 However, the 
lack of legal justiﬁcation for the killing in such an intervention is derivative of 
the illegality of the intervention. And the latter is not itself explicable with ref-
erence to the deeper wrong of killing without the justiﬁcation of responding to 
the threat or inﬂiction of illegal killing or analogous violence. 
The problem posed by the purported criminality of humanitarian interven-
tion, then, is that the lack of legal justiﬁcation for killing in a humanitarian in-
tervention might be thought to reﬂect a privileging of sovereign rights over the 
value of human life.
223
 Such interventions do, after all, tend to have signiﬁcant 
impact on the political independence and territorial integrity of the target 
state.
224
 On that basis, if humanitarian intervention is criminal, this might 
seem to militate in favor of the traditional sovereignty-focused account, and 
against the unjustiﬁed killing account, of aggression. 
As with the concern about bloodless invasion, however, the objection fails. 
First, it misrepresents the normative status of humanitarian intervention in the 
contemporary order. The illegality of such interventions is not about protecting 
sovereignty over human life; it is about banning “good” wars so as not to en-
courage or facilitate “bad” wars. If genuine humanitarian interventions are 
criminal, it is so as to prevent the unjustiﬁed killing of disproportionate or pre-
textual interventions. Second, as discussed in Part V, there is ample interpretive 
space, and good reason, to exclude presumptively illegal humanitarian inter-
vention from the crime. 
 
This explains why the legal right to use force obtains only when the state responds propor-
tionately to an armed attack, and not when it faces more severe, but nonviolent, violations of 
its territorial integrity, its political independence, or the self-determination of its people. See 
supra notes 105-109, 115-121 and accompanying text. 
222. This, at least, distinguishes them from plainly noncriminal, nonviolent sovereignty in-
fringements. See supra Section III.A. 
223. This is the root of Luban’s charge that the criminalization of aggression has been “a major 
moral enemy of the human rights movement.” See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
224. The Kosovo intervention resulted in the external administration and subsequent secession of 
the territory. See S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 10 (June 10, 1999) (establishing the U.N. Interim Admin-
istration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and thus usurping the political authority of Serbia 
and Montenegro); International Recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo, REPUBLIC  
KOS. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224 [http://perma.cc
/G8ZF-G6KM] (listing states that have recognized Kosovo’s sovereign status). Tanzania’s 
intervention in Uganda resulted in the overthrow of the Ugandan government. THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 143-44 
(2002). India’s intervention in East Pakistan precipitated the secession of that territory, 
which became Bangladesh. Id. at 139-42. 
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In any domain, there is an inevitable gap between even optimally crafted 
law and the internal normative foundations of that law.
225
 Put another way, 
there are always hard cases, where legal status does not reﬂect moral status, 
even when judged against the very moral standards on which the law is prem-
ised. This is for the familiar reason that optimal legal rules, unlike the underly-
ing moral principles of right and wrong, must take account of moral hazard, 
the risks of abuse, the danger of slippery slopes, the collateral impact of rules 
on broader normative culture, and the “migration” of regulated behaviors out 
of the intended domain.
226
 
On a normative account that has gained particular prominence since 
NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, and which offers the most coherent ex-
planation of contemporary international law in this area, humanitarian inter-
ventions fall precisely into this gap between the law and its own underlying 
moral posture.
227
 Along these lines, an inﬂuential independent report on the 
Kosovo intervention declared NATO’s actions to have been “illegal but legiti-
mate.”
228
 Prominent voices have endorsed this as the appropriate, long-term 
normative equilibrium for humanitarian intervention.
229
 And several of the 
 
225. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE 
DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001); ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALI-
TY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 199 (1999); Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (1991). 
226. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 671 
(1994); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the ‘War on Terrorism,’ 1 J. NAT’L SECU-
RITY L. & POL’Y 285, 307-18 (2005). 
227. The account described in this Section is perhaps the most common moral defense of the ex-
isting regime. See Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 
19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1020 (1998); W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Trans-
formations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3, 16 (2000). 
228. INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RE-
SPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000). 
229. See FRANCK, supra note 224, at 166-89 (framing the issue as one of “good law producing a 
very bad result” and “hard cases” making “bad law”); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 126 (1991) (“It would be better to acquiesce in a violation 
that is considered necessary and desirable in the particular circumstances than to adopt a 
principle that would open a wide gap in the barrier against unilateral use of force.”); see also 
Anthea Roberts, Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal but Justiﬁed?, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 179, 212-13 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDon-
ald eds., 2008) (arguing that the “illegal but justiﬁed” frame might “ossify” the law in that 
posture, obstructing customary reform through shifting practice); Stromseth, supra note 215 
(arguing that the uncertain legality of humanitarian intervention serves to increase the bur-
den of justiﬁcation on those who would intervene without U.N. authorization). 
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states that participated in the campaign claimed moral justiﬁcation, while in-
sisting that the intervention ought not be understood as a legal precedent.
230
 
Underpinning this idea is the view that an explicit ex ante legal permission 
for even genuine humanitarian wars would facilitate the waging of both non-
humanitarian interventions on a humanitarian pretext and disproportionate 
interventions that far exceed their humanitarian purpose, and that these twin 
dangers outweigh the beneﬁt of enabling genuine, proportionate humanitarian 
interventions.
231
 In short, the aggregate risk of false positives under a permis-
sive regime is thought to outweigh the risk of false negatives under a restrictive 
regime. 
Pretext is a heightened danger here because the jus ad bellum is typically 
evaluated and enforced not by a judicial authority, capable of engaging in ﬁne-
grained, case-by-case analysis, but by states acting collectively to sanction and 
ostracize lawbreakers.
232
 In that sense the effective enforcement of the jus ad 
bellum depends on broad consensus in each case. Because the precise threshold 
for humanitarian intervention is less easily identiﬁed than is the armed attack 
threshold of self-defense, it would be difficult, were genuine humanitarian in-
tervention lawful, for an uncoordinated population of states to engage in such 
 
230. See Stromseth, supra note 215, at 239 (discussing the French and German positions against 
treating the war as a precedent). These same leaders identiﬁed a humanitarian moral imper-
ative to act. See, e.g., DANIEL LEVY & NATAN SZNAIDER, THE HOLOCAUST AND MEMORY IN THE 
GLOBAL AGE 166 (2006) (noting that the German Chancellor, Foreign Minister, and Defense 
Minister “all cited the lessons of the Holocaust to justify sending troops to Kosovo”); U.N. 
GAOR, 54th Sess., 14th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.14 (Sept. 25, 1999); NATO Attack on 
Kosovo Begins, CNN (Mar. 24, 1999, 3:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe
/9903/24/kosovo.strikes [http://perma.cc/Y2VK-YUJZ] (quoting French President Jacques 
Chirac’s explanation that Serbia’s “unacceptable” treatment of Kosovar Albanians had trig-
gered an imperative to act to “contain a tragedy”). 
231. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 91, at 74; FRANCK, supra note 224, at 175-78; GRAY, supra note 
216, at 52; SCHACHTER, supra note 229, at 126; Simon Chesterman, Hard Cases Make Bad 
Law: Law, Ethics, and Politics in Humanitarian Intervention, in JUST INTERVENTION 46, 50 
(Anthony F. Lang Jr. ed., 2003); Kutz, supra note 51, at 230; U.K. Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, Foreign Policy Doc. No. 148, reprinted in U.K. Materials on International Law, 
57 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 614, 619 (1986). But see Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention 
and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 107, 110-11, 126-27 (2006) (arguing that claim-
ing a humanitarian intervention justiﬁcation is more likely to generate pressure on leaders 
to limit their uses of force than would claiming self-defense). 
232. On the collective enforcement of international law, see, for example, Hathaway & Shapiro, 
Outcasting, supra note 21. See also text accompanying infra note 258 (discussing the sanctions 
imposed on Russia). On the relevance of disagreement here, consider Hersch Lauterpacht’s 
observation that “the existing imperfections of the law in the matter of determining whether 
there has occurred a breach of the obligation not to have recourse to aggressive war are 
themselves part of the law.” Lauterpacht, supra note 33, at 211. 
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collective enforcement against states that wage illegal war on a humanitarian 
pretext. Or so the theory goes. 
Understanding the illegality of unauthorized humanitarian intervention in 
this way makes better sense of the contemporary legal structure than does the 
sovereignty-based account. It ﬁts with the notion that the Security Council is 
thought to have a responsibility to authorize (and thus render lawful) precisely 
the same substantive action.
233
 The procedural requirement of Council authori-
zation imposes a political and epistemic check that is likely to block the vast 
majority of pretextual interventions.
234
 Although some genuine humanitarian 
interventions will be prohibited, the presumption is that this is a defensible 
tradeoff, especially if the genuine interventions can be excused as legitimate 
post hoc.
235
 This understanding also makes sense of the debate regarding hu-
manitarian intervention’s illegality. As a hard case on the law’s own normative 
terms, it is not surprising that different states and commentators have come to 
different legal views as to its permissibility.
236
 
 
233. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. On the potential impact of even limited Security 
Council-authorized interventions on the target state’s political independence, consider the 
way in which the narrow aerial intervention in Libya in 2011 led to regime change (whether 
as a necessary means to (or collateral effect of) its humanitarian aim, or, less charitably, as a 
deliberate exploitation by the intervening states of the authority granted them by the Coun-
cil). See, e.g., Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime 
Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 387-91 (2012); Simon Tisdall, The Consensus on Inter-
vention in Libya Has Shattered, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2011, 11:11 PM), http://www.theguard 
ian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/libya-ceaseﬁre-consensus-russia-china-india [http://
perma.cc/PM6P-EP9M]. 
234. Cf. FRANCK, supra note 224, at 102-05 (discussing the Security Council’s “jury” function in 
checking abuses of preemptive self-defense); id. at 185-87 (discussing the ex post facto 
“jurying” of the U.N.’s political organs in retrospectively excusing a humanitarian interven-
tion). 
235. See sources cited supra notes 229-231. Even those who consider the Council to be broken seek 
to replicate the same function by requiring the endorsement of a diverse coalition or regional 
organization. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 139, ¶¶ 6.28-6.40; Cook, supra note 215, at 
647; see also Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, Precommitment Regimes for Intervention: 
Supplementing the Security Council, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 41, 52-55 (2011) (describing the 
structure of a democratic coalition regime). 
236. See supra notes 215-216. Given the recent nature of both the responsibility to protect and the 
willingness of states to claim the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention, the case for this 
understanding of the illegality of humanitarian intervention is plainly stronger today than it 
was in 1998. However, the “benevolent silence” of the international community vis-à-vis 
earlier interventions suggests that it may have been the optimal normative account even at 
that earlier stage in international law’s ongoing evolution. FRANCK, supra note 224, at 154. See 
generally id. ch. 9 (examining the international responses to several humanitarian interven-
tions prior to the development of the responsibility to protect the norm). 
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Most signiﬁcantly here, this account of humanitarian intervention’s illegali-
ty is compatible with the normative account of aggression described above. 
Humanitarian intervention, on this understanding, is illegal not because it in-
ﬂicts the wrong of massive killing without responding defensively to the threat 
or inﬂiction of the same, but because permitting it would encourage wars that 
do inﬂict that wrong—that is, pretextual or disproportionate interventions. If 
humanitarian interventions are criminal, therefore, it is with a view to the pre-
vention of unjustiﬁed killing, even though those interventions do not them-
selves inﬂict that wrong. 
This reconciles the illegality (and possible criminality) of humanitarian in-
tervention with the unjustiﬁed killing account. However, it also highlights the 
unusual nature of humanitarian intervention among illegal uses of force—
namely, that it lacks the core criminal wrong of aggression. As discussed in the 
next Part, even assuming the illegality of humanitarian intervention, this mili-
tates against its criminality, and there is ample interpretive space to exclude it 
from the crime. 
v. why it  matters that aggression is  a crime of unjustified 
killing 
Getting the normative underpinnings of the crime of aggression right is not 
a purely theoretical exercise. Doing so has practical consequences for the law 
and its application. In forthcoming work, I elaborate three such consequences, 
which are introduced here.
237
 The ﬁrst, raised tangentially in Part IV, empha-
sizes how understanding the moral meaning of a crime can help to guide inter-
pretation of ambiguous aspects of that very criminal prohibition. The second 
and third identify implications for related rules governing how we treat sol-
diers on either side of an aggressive war. 
A. The Utility of Normative Clarity in Resolving Ambiguous Cases 
The ﬁrst internal implication of identifying the wrong of aggressive war as 
the inﬂiction of massive killing not in response to the same is that this clariﬁes 
the object and purpose of the crime, and thus sheds light on how the ICC 
should interpret ambiguous cases.
238
 As indicated above, both bloodless inva-
sion and humanitarian intervention fall into this category. The ﬁrst, although 
 
237. See Dannenbaum, supra note 31. 
238. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 80, art. 31 (requiring that a treaty 
be interpreted in a way that coheres with its object and purpose). 
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clearly illegal, has a mixed criminal law legacy; the second is of disputed legali-
ty and has not been evaluated in criminal case law. 
The focus here is different from that in Part IV. There, the task was to ex-
plain why the (presumed) illegality of humanitarian intervention and the du-
bious (but presumed) criminality of bloodless invasions are compatible with 
the unjustiﬁed killing account of aggression. This Part turns to the separate and 
distinct question of what the unjustiﬁed killing account indicates regarding the 
optimal legal assessment of either action by the ICC. In contrast to the tradi-
tional account, the unjustiﬁed killing account of aggression weighs against the 
criminality of either action. 
As argued above, if humanitarian intervention is currently illegal, it is “ille-
gal but legitimate” by the law’s own normative lights. Two factors explain why 
this means that the best interpretation of Article 8 bis would exclude such wars. 
First, the condemnation and punishment inherent in criminal conviction 
heighten the imperative to narrow the gap between laws and the moral princi-
ples that underpin them.
239
 This is particularly so in a domain focused exclu-
sively on “the most serious crimes.”
240
 The normative authority of international 
criminal law would suffer if the leader of a genuine humanitarian intervention 
were convicted of the “supreme international crime” of aggression, despite not 
perpetrating its core “accumulated evil.”
241
 In other words, the justiﬁcatory 
threshold for a regime under which an action is “supremely criminal but legit-
imate” is signiﬁcantly higher than is that for a regime under which an action is 
merely “illegal but legitimate.” 
Second, whereas the jus ad bellum is ordinarily enforced collectively by 
states, international crimes are enforced by a single judicial authority capable of 
reaching nuanced case-by-case judgments with authoritative effect.
242
 As such, 
 
239. On “the gap,” see Alexander, supra note 225, at 696. On the imperative to narrow it, see id. at 
698, which states that “[i]t is difficult to bring ourselves to punish those who have done 
what we acknowledge was the correct thing to do, even when we understand the consequen-
tialist warrant for punishing them.” See also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
240. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶ 4; see also sources cited supra note 18 (describing the 
moral condemnation entailed in international criminal punishment). Claims that a given ac-
tion could be internationally criminal, but legitimate, are rare. For a highly controversial po-
sition along those lines, see HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State of Isr. 
53(4) PD 817 (1999) (Isr.) (holding that individuals may be criminally liable for engaging in 
torture, even when doing so is morally required by urgent necessity, and resolving that the 
best such soldiers can hope for is the post hoc mercy of the prosecutors or the courts). 
241. On the notion of aggression as an “accumulated evil” and the “supreme international crime,” 
see IMT Judgment, supra note 2, at 427. 
242. Under the ICC’s system of complementarity, domestic courts have primacy and a ﬁnal say in 
the case, unless the relevant domestic actors prove unwilling or unable to investigate and (if 
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unlike the broader jus ad bellum, international criminal law operates in an insti-
tutional context in which a rule permitting genuine humanitarian interventions 
would not thereby encourage large numbers of bad wars.
243
 In that sense, the 
key justiﬁcation for humanitarian intervention’s illegality is inapplicable in the 
criminal context. 
Consider these points together. The justiﬁcation for criminalizing humani-
tarian intervention despite it lacking the core wrong is higher than is the 
threshold for justifying its illegality. And a core aspect of the justiﬁcation for its 
illegality is anyway absent. Combining this with the observation above that 
humanitarian intervention lacks the core criminal wrong, there is good internal 
reason to exclude humanitarian intervention from the crime. 
This frames how the ICC ought to interpret aggression. Article 8 bis (1) 
provides that only those illegal uses of force with the “character” and “gravity” 
to constitute a “manifest” violation of the Charter are criminal.
244
 As the at-
tached understandings emphasize, “aggression is the most serious and danger-
ous form of the illegal use of force; . . . a determination whether an act of ag-
gression has been committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of 
each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their con-
sequences.”
245 
The normative account put forward in this Article demands measuring the 
“seriousness,” “gravity,” “character,” and “danger” of an illegal use of force by its 
unjustiﬁed inﬂiction of human death and suffering. Pursuant to that reading, 
genuine humanitarian interventions would fall short of the criminal threshold. 
In that sense, Harold Koh and Todd Buchwald are right to insist that, 
“[w]hatever one’s legal views on whether humanitarian intervention is a per-
missible basis under international law for resorting to force, a true humanitari-
 
appropriate) prosecute perpetrators, at which point the international court takes over. Rome 
Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a)-(c). 
243. See supra notes 232-235 and accompanying text. 
244. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (1); see also, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 218, at 486 
(“[T]he only way for any party to address potentially unlawful but nonetheless legitimate 
uses of force is with reference to the tripartite factors of character, gravity, and scale . . . . The 
term ‘character’, as a more qualitative term, is the most elastic of the three factors and might 
provide an opening . . . .”). But see Murphy, supra note 219, at 362 (“Rather than carve out 
humanitarian intervention, the purpose of the threshold language . . . seems to be to elimi-
nate minor incidents of armed force from the crime of aggression, such as frontier incidents 
involving border patrols or coast guards.”). 
245. ICC Aggression Amendments, supra note 1, annex III, ¶ 6. 
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an intervention . . . should not entail the risk of international criminal prosecu-
tion.”
246
 
For similar reasons, the normative account presented here can guide the in-
terpretation of bloodless invasions. On the dominant, sovereignty-focused ac-
count, the proper interpretation of Article 8 bis would surely include future ac-
tions along the lines of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
247
 The account 
presented here insists instead that such cases are not at all clear-cut. If any-
thing, the stronger argument is for their exclusion from the crime. 
This position may seem to be out of sync with the widespread condemna-
tion of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which a number of states labeled “ag-
gression.”
248
 Indeed, there was good reason to use the term. As Tancredi ob-
serves, the Russian intervention exempliﬁed several of the acts of aggression 
listed in Article 3 of the General Assembly’s deﬁnition.
249
 Those same acts are 
included in the identical list in Article 8 bis (2) of the Rome Statute amend-
ment. 
However, there is a crucial distinction. Public condemnations of Russia’s ac-
tions have not claimed criminality, and criminal punishment of the Russian or-
chestrators has never been on the table. This is important, because one can 
hold that the Crimean intervention was an act of aggression without endorsing 
the notion that it exempliﬁed a criminal use of force. The “character” and 
“gravity” thresholds internal to Article 8 bis qualify “acts of aggression,” includ-
ing precisely those listed in 8 bis (2).
250
 In other words, by the very structure of 
the provision, not all instances of the listed acts of aggression are criminal, only 
those of the requisite character and gravity.
251
 
Measured with reference to unjustiﬁed human harm, the latent violence 
that could underpin the criminality of bloodless invasions is plainly of lesser 
“seriousness,” “danger,” and “gravity” and of a different “character” than con-
summated violence.
252
 As such, bloodless invasions fall somewhere between 
 
246. Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspec-
tive, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 273 (2015). 
247. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text. Prosecution for the action in Crimea itself is 
not feasible at the ICC, since Russia is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, and Article 8 
bis will have only prospective effect. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 15 bis (2), 15 ter (2). 
248. Corten, supra note 187, at 29-30; Tancredi, supra note 187, at 19. 
249. Tancredi, supra note 187, at 19-29. 
250. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis (1)-(2). 
251. Notably these thresholds are internal to the deﬁnition of the crime, unlike the general gravi-
ty requirement in the Court’s admissibility criteria. See id. art. 17, ¶ 1(d). 
252. This reﬂects a general principle that, although the attachment of latent violence to a lower-
level legal breach serves as a gravity multiplier, consummated violence is graver still. If an 
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clearly noncriminal acts—like illegally, but nonviolently, manipulating foreign 
elections—and clearly criminal, high-casualty invasions. This raises the real 
possibility that even highly effective bloodless invasions are not criminal under 
Article 8 bis. 
There is an obviously troubling aspect to letting the leaders of a bloodless 
invasion off the criminal hook. Had their presence been resisted by Ukraine, 
Russian troops stationed in Crimea would almost certainly have responded 
with lethal force. That was surely why they were stationed throughout the ter-
ritory, and it is how Russian forces reacted to resistance in Donbass subse-
quently.
253
 In that sense, the bloodlessness of Crimea was due not to restraint 
in Moscow, but to supererogatory restraint in Kiev.
254
 To condemn and punish 
leaders for one of these invasion types and not the other might appear morally 
arbitrary. 
However, such divergent treatment is commonly accepted in morality and 
law. Persons are judged morally not on what they would have done had cir-
cumstances outside of their control been different, but on what they actually 
did.
255
 Similarly, criminal law gives the perpetrator the strong beneﬁt of the 
doubt, recognizing, however unlikely it may be, that a threat may never have 
been consummated, and that those who make a threat, even if it succeeds, 
should not be treated equivalently to those who make and consummate that 
threat. Notably, most other international crimes require more than latent un-
justiﬁed violence: they require its direct inﬂiction. There are rare exceptions, 
such as the war crime of “declaring that no quarter will be given” or the crime 
of inviting unjustiﬁed killing through shielding one’s own troops with civil-
ians.
256
 But those crimes are anomalous and aggression is the “supreme” crime, 
 
armed mugging is more serious than merely stealing the same item, killing an individual 
who resists that mugging is more serious a violation still. For more on how latent violence 
aggravates wrongfulness (as in the difference between armed mugging and merely stealing 
the same item), see supra notes 199-214 and accompanying text. 
253. OHCHR 2016 Report, supra note 194, ¶¶ 2, 22, 28, 37 (noting casualties in Donetsk and 
Russian involvement in Ukraine). 
254. Although Ukraine’s leaders were lauded for their restraint in refraining from using force in 
Crimea at the Security Council, most would recognize that they had the right to respond 
militarily to Russia’s actions. For statements of the representatives from Luxembourg, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom praising Ukrainian restraint, see U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.7134, supra note 204, at 4-5, 7. 
255. See Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (1979); Bernard Williams, Moral 
Luck, in MORAL LUCK 20 (1981). 
256. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8, ¶¶ 2(b)(xii), 2(b)(xxiii), 2(e)(x). 
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deﬁned by an internal gravity threshold.
257
 There is good reason to hold that 
bloodless invasion falls short of that threshold. 
To be clear, the noncriminality of such actions is compatible both with the 
dominant view that Russia engaged in a serious violation of public internation-
al law, and with the collective and severe sanctions imposed on Russia in re-
sponse, including nonrecognition of the annexation.
258
 Bloodless invasions are 
serious violations of international law that warrant signiﬁcant consequences. 
The argument above goes only to the question of whether the leaders of states 
that engage in such actions should be prosecuted as the world’s supreme crimi-
nals, alongside perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. 
This is not to say that the normative account presented here disposes une-
quivocally with the question of bloodless invasion’s criminality. As explained in 
Part IV, the unjustiﬁed killing account is compatible with a lower threshold 
that would include bloodless aggressions as criminal.
259
 However, in recogniz-
ing that such invasions are less grave on the core measure of the crime’s wrong-
fulness, and in stark contrast to the dominant account, the argument weighs 
against including such invasions among the “most serious and dangerous” 
forms of illegal force that count as instances of the “supreme crime.” The best 
interpretation of Article 8 bis is that bloodless invasions are not criminal. 
Even if it were thought appropriate, after reﬂection and debate, to adopt a 
lower threshold and count some bloodless invasions as criminal aggressions, 
the account presented here would identify a criminality threshold within the 
category of bloodless invasions. Speciﬁcally, criminality would turn on the 
scope of the action’s latent human violence. 
B. The Right To Disobey 
The second practical implication of the normative account presented here 
goes to the legal rights of soldiers ordered to ﬁght in criminal wars. Viewed on 
the traditional account as remote, and thus morally detached, from the macro 
wrong against the victim state, such soldiers have been denied an international-
 
257. See supra notes 26, 250-251 and accompanying text. 
258. See G.A. Res. 68/262, ¶¶ 5-6 (Mar. 27, 2014); Edward Hunter Christie, Sanctions After Cri-
mea: Have They Worked?, NATO REV. MAG., http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015
/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/index.htm [http://perma.cc/HJ8F 
-WGD6]; EU Sanctions Against Russia over Ukraine Crisis, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/news
room/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm [http://perma.cc/NK4T 
-DPCM]. 
259. See supra Section IV.A. 
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ly protected right to refuse to participate. On the account presented here, that is 
a mistake. Although typically nonculpable, soldiers are involved intimately in 
the unjustiﬁed killing and violence that are the core criminal wrongs of aggres-
sive war. A better interpretation of existing law would recognize their right to 
refuse to perform those wrongs. 
It is legally clear that only those who control, or at least inﬂuence, the poli-
cy to wage illegal war can be criminally liable for aggression.
260
 On the 
Walzerian normative account, this reﬂects the deeper moral truth that soldiers 
are responsible only for what falls within “their own sphere of activity.”
261
 They 
are detached morally from any macro interstate wrong, because they lack inﬂu-
ence at that level.
262
 This idea of a tightly deﬁned sphere of soldierly activity 
and responsibility underpins the so-called “moral equality” of combatants—the 
idea that soldiers waging an aggressive war are no less licensed morally to kill 
combatants (and proportionate collateral civilians) than are their opponents
.263
 
The idea that trivial or remote contributions to a macro wrong can be sub-
ject so easily to moral detachment ought to be controversial from the legal 
point of view, particularly in light of international criminal law’s broad and oft-
used doctrines of shared responsibility.
264
 But even accepting that premise, on 
 
260. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. For more on the leadership element, see Heller, 
supra note 65. See also Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts 43(2) (1977) 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (on the combatant’s privilege to ﬁght with immunity if 
jus in bello compliant). 
261. WALZER, supra note 11, at 39; see id. at 304; Paul W. Kahn, The Paradox of Riskless Warfare, 22 
PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 2 (2002); Dan Zupan, A Presumption of the Moral Equality of Combat-
ants: A Citizen-Soldier’s Perspective, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
STATUS OF SOLDIERS 214, 214 (David Rodin & Henry Shue eds., 2008). 
262. See WALZER, supra note 11, at 39 (claiming that “[g]enerals may well straddle the line” of 
culpability in that regard, but “that only suggests that we know pretty well where it should 
be drawn”); see also supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. 
263. See WALZER, supra note 11, at 35. For elaboration on the moral equality idea, see PAUL CHRIS-
TOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 25 (1994); WALZER, supra note 11 at 21, 34-41, 127-
28, 136-37, 299-306; DANIEL S. ZUPAN, WAR, MORALITY, AND AUTONOMY: AN INVESTIGATION 
IN JUST WAR THEORY, 67, 76-77, 128 (2003); G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, Mr. Truman’s Degree, in 
ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 62, 67 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1981) (1961); Kahn, supra 
note 261, at 2-3; Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 138-40 (1972); 
and Walzer, supra note 84, at 43-45. 
264. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 25, ¶ 3(d); Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Conﬁrmation of Charges (Pre-Trial Chamber I) ¶ 288 
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_06457.PDF [http://
perma.cc/3VYT-QXSC]; Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 191, 196-222 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia: Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999); Elies van Sliedregt, 
Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. 
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the unjustiﬁed killing account, soldiers are not remote from the wrong of ag-
gression. Quite the opposite: the interstate violation is criminal because the kill-
ings of the soldiers on the aggressor side, unlike those of their enemies, cannot 
be justiﬁed. The moral foundations of that legal posture are best explained by 
Walzer’s revisionist critics, who have insisted that it is untenable to hold that 
soldiers participating in an aggressive war have a moral license to “kill people 
who have done nothing other than to defend themselves and other morally in-
nocent people from an unjust attack.”
265
 
To identify the legal relevance of this insight is not to hold that soldiers 
should be criminally liable for participating in aggressive wars.
266
 On the con-
trary, there are two cumulative reasons to grant soldiers blanket jus ad bellum 
immunity. First, their typical uncertainty about the war’s legality, their associa-
tive sympathies, and the heightened culpability threshold for international 
criminal liability mean that very few soldiers are sufficiently culpable for their 
wrongful killings to warrant prosecution.
267
 Moreover, it is institutionally in-
feasible to identify the few that surpass that threshold.
268
 Second, guaranteeing 
soldiers jus ad bellum immunity arguably helps to frame a set of incentives max-
imally conducive to jus in bello compliance and thus mitigates the horrors of 
 
JUST. 184, 187 (2007); Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC 
Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953, 969 (2007). For a philosophical account of noncontrol-
ling culpability, see CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE 
AGE 113-145 (2007). 
265. MCMAHAN, supra note 84, at 35. For more information, see generally many of the contribu-
tions to JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS, supra 
note 261, which is structured around the moral equality of combatants question, with voices 
on both sides. In addition to McMahan, who has been particularly proliﬁc on this issue, see, 
for example, RODIN, supra note 53, at 165-73; David Rodin, Two Emerging Issues of Jus Post 
Bellum, in JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE, 53, 
68-75 (Carsten Stahn & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008); and David R. Mapel, Response to War 
and Self-Defense: Innocent Attackers and Rights of Self-Defense, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 81 
(2004). As noted above, this position has been articulated in the context of moral philoso-
phy, not as a normative account of the law we have. See supra note 84 and accompanying 
text. 
266. MOSHE HALBERTAL, ON SACRIFICE 69, 85, 88-89 (2012) (noting a “moral self-deception” in 
the notion that the risk borne by soldiers on both sides creates a moral equality and insisting 
that even though it may be sensible not to punish soldiers for participating in wars of ag-
gression, “there is, morally speaking, a huge difference between” aggressor soldiers and 
those on the defensive side). 
267. See, e.g., id. at 110-15, 191; Judith Lichtenberg, How To Judge Soldiers Whose Cause Is Unjust, 
in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS, supra note 261, 
at 112, 123-24. 
268. See Lichtenberg, supra note 267, at 125; Mapel, supra note 265, at 83; Ernst J. Cohn, The Prob-
lem of War Crimes To-day, TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 125, 144 (1941). 
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war, once underway.
269
 Given soldiers’ typical nonculpability, sharpening the 
impact of the in bello regime in this way sets the best incentives for good con-
duct. 
However, these good reasons not to punish soldiers for aggression cannot 
reverse the wrongfulness of their jus-in-bello-compliant killing in a criminal 
war.
270
 This is not merely a point about philosophical accuracy. It goes to the 
proper interpretation of soldiers’ rights. 
Soldiers have a clear right to disobey orders that violate jus in bello.
271
 
Those punished for such refusal are eligible for refugee status.
272
 Neither the 
 
269. On the role of the jus in bello in limiting the horrors of war by applying a universal minimum 
irrespective of the jus ad bellum, see CHRISTOPHER, supra note 163, at 163 (1994); WALZER, 
supra note 11, at 31, 33, 129-137; Janina Dill & Henry Shue, Limiting the Killing in War: Mili-
tary Necessity and the St. Petersburg Assumption, 26 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 311, 319, 324 (2012); 
Lauterpacht, supra note 33, at 212, 224, 233; Tamar Meisels, Combatants—Lawful and Unlaw-
ful, 26 LAW & PHIL. 31, 45 (2007); and Henry Shue, Do We Need a ‘Morality of War’?, in JUST 
AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS, supra note 261, at 31, 
33, 129-137. On the importance of reciprocity in enforcement, see Lauterpacht, supra note 33, 
at 242; and James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 559 (2007). On the soldier’s immunity for all acts compliant with jus in bello, see Addi-
tional Protocol I, supra note 260, arts. 43-45. This stated succinctly a position that underpins 
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949). See also 
Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 205, 212 (1977) (“The con-
cept of penal sanctions in the law of war is based on certain fundamental assumptions. One 
of the most crucial of these is that those who are entitled to the juridical status of ‘privileged 
combatant’ are immune from criminal prosecution for those warlike acts which do not vio-
late the laws and customs of war but which might otherwise be common crimes under mu-
nicipal law.”). 
270. Lauterpacht argues that the normative logic of the criminalization of aggression implies that 
the constituent killings are murderous, but insists that this provides a “warning against in-
discriminate reliance on legal logic in this matter.” Lauterpacht, supra note 33, at 218. How-
ever, his arguments in this respect are all immunity arguments, not permissibility or noncul-
pability arguments. Emphasizing the distinction, see, for example, Jurisdictional Immunities 
of the State (Ger. v. It.), 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶ 52 (Feb. 3), which ﬁnds Germany immune for acts 
that displayed a “complete disregard for the ‘elementary considerations of humanity’”; and 
Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 731, 763-64 (2012). As Janina 
Dill and Henry Shue observe, jus in bello rules “need not be in the business of blessing what 
they do not prohibit.” Dill & Shue, supra note 269, at 319. Additional Protocol I, the key con-
temporary text of the war convention, recognizes this explicitly, providing in its preamble 
that the application of the same jus in bello rules to both parties to the conﬂict is not to be 
understood in any way as “legitimizing or authorizing” violations of the jus ad bellum. Addi-
tional Protocol I, supra note 260, at 239; see Dill & Shue, supra note 269, at 318-19, 325-26; 
Henry Shue, Laws of War, Morality, and International Politics: Compliance, Stringency, and 
Limits, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 271, 279, 283-84 (2013). 
271. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 892 art. 92 (2006); Armed Forces 
Act 2006, c. 52, art. 12 (U.K.); United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2001); U.S. 
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core right, nor the refugee claim, requires that the soldier would have been per-
sonally criminally liable had he obeyed the illegal orders; it is enough that, if 
obedient, he would have been sufficiently intimately associated with the wrong 
to be unable to “wash his hands of guilt.”
273
 
Similar rights have not been extended to those who refuse to ﬁght in crimi-
nal wars of aggression. When not relying on the political question doctrine to 
ignore such claims, domestic and foreign courts have reasoned that there is no 
right to disobey such orders because there is no legal duty to do so—because, in 
other words, the individual soldier’s contribution to a criminal war is not itself 
wrongful from the legal point of view.
274
 This position was applied even in 
 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-2: YOUR CONDUCT IN COMBAT UNDER THE LAW OF 
WAR (1984); U.K. Ministry of Defence, 1 Manual of Service Law, Jan. 31, 2011, ch. 7, at 1-7-
40 to 1-7-41 (Oct. 3, 2016); see also G.A. Res. 53/144, art. 10, Declaration on the Right and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Univer-
sally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Mar. 8, 1999) [hereinafter 
U.N. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders] (explaining that “no one shall be subjected 
to punishment or adverse action of any kind for refusing to” participate “in violating human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”); COUNCIL OF EUR., ENSURING PROTECTION-EUROPEAN 
UNION GUIDELINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS (2008) (providing guidelines for im-
plementing the U.N. Declaration in Europe). 
272. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for De-
termining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, ¶ 171, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979, reedited 1992); see also 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011, 
337 O.J. (L 337) 9, 16; JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 180-81 (1991).  
273. Key v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2008] F.C. 838, para. 23 (Can.). On refugee 
law, see, for example, id. ¶¶ 14-29; and Krotov v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] 
EWCA (Civ) 69 (Eng.). Domestically, see, for example, New, 55 M.J. at 100; U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES ¶ 14(c)(2)(a)(i), at iv-19 (2008), 
which permits soldiers to challenge the legality of orders that are not patently illegal, but 
places the evidentiary burden on the disobedient soldier in the case of orders that are illegal, 
but not patently so; and MARK OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS 242 (1999), which states that 
“[s]everal Northern European states excuse the soldier who disobeys lawful orders he rea-
sonably believes to be illegal.” 
274. Among home courts refusing their soldiers the right to disobey orders to participate in a 
criminal war, see, for example, United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 114-15 (1995); R 
v. Lyons [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2808; RAF Doctor Jailed Over Iraq Refusal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 
13, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/apr/13/military.iraq [http://perma.cc
/LBE5-VZM7]; and RAF Doctor Must Face Iraq Court Martial, DAILY MAIL, (Mar. 22, 2006), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-380677/RAF-doctor-face-Iraq-court-martial.html 
[http://perma.cc/E8GL-V6N5]. See also U.S. v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 590 (8th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1030 (1987). For sources on denying a deserter’s asylum claim, see Col-
by v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2008] F.C. 805 paras. 11, 15 (Can.); Hinzman 
v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2006] FC 420 paras. 141-42, 158-60 (Can.); 
Hughey v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration [2006] F.C. 421, para. 153 (Can.); and 
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Germany after the IMT judgment to those who had refused to ﬁght in Nazi 
aggressions.
275
 
If the normative core of aggression were a macro interstate wrong, treating 
jus ad bellum resisters in this way might be normatively comprehensible given 
how far removed they are from that macro violation. However, if soldiers’ con-
tributions to an aggressive war are the wrongs that make the war worthy of 
criminalization, soldiers that refuse to ﬁght on those grounds sound their 
claims in the law’s own normative register. They cannot be told coherently that 
they ought to be able to wash their hands of guilt.  
As I explore in forthcoming work, perhaps the most plausible alternative 
explanation for the denial of soldiers’ rights to disobey rests on the damage 
that recognizing such rights would do to the functioning of military institu-
tions in lawful wars, and thus to global security.
276
 This justiﬁcation, however, 
is contingent on both the nature of war and the nature of military institutions. 
That contingency underpins an imperative internal to international law’s own 
normative posture to carve out disobedience rights for soldiers refusing to ﬁght 
in criminal wars whenever doing so would be compatible with preserving mili-
tary functionality in lawful wars. 
The results of two isolated cases offer hope for a more coherent jurispru-
dence in this respect. Mohammed Al-Maisri, a Yemeni deserter from the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, was granted asylum in Canada in 1995 on the 
 
Press Release, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [Federal Office for Migration  
and Refugees], Kein Asyl für US-Deserteur [No Asylum for US Deserter] (Apr.  
4, 2011) http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2011/110404-0009-pre
ssemitteilung-deserteur.html?nn=1366068 [http://perma.cc/F47V-C94Y]. The Federal 
Court of Appeal upheld the Federal Court’s denial of Hinzman’s and Hughey’s applications 
for refugee status without addressing the relevance of the war’s legality, instead dismissing 
the claim on the grounds that the procedural safeguards in U.S. courts were sufficient to en-
sure that they would not be persecuted even if they were prosecuted for their desertions. 
Hinzman v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2007] F.C.A. 171, paras. 39-62 (Can.), 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 321. 
275. Adolf Arndt & Gustav Radbruch, In re Garbe, 2 SÜDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 323, 323-
30 (June 1947); Antifaschistisches Gewissen: Garbe im Kreuzfeuer [Antifascist Conscience: Garbe 
in the Crossﬁre], DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 25, 1947, at 7; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 33, at 240-41 
n.2. The vast majority of the more than eight thousand Nazi soldiers who survived the war 
with desertion convictions lived the rest of their lives as convicted felons; political clemency 
was not granted until the new millennium. See Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur 
Aufhebung nationalsozialistischer Unrechtsurteile in der Strafrechtspﬂege [Statute Amend-
ing the Statute Repealing Nazi Wrongful Judgments in Criminal Justice], July 23, 2002, 
BGBL I at 23, § 2714 (Ger.); Tristana Moore, Nazi Deserter Hails Long-Awaited Triumph, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 8, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8244186.stm [http://perma.cc/446Y 
-BN45]. 
276. See Dannenbaum, supra note 31. 
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grounds that “the invasion and occupation of Kuwait was condemned by the 
United Nations.”
277
 And Florian Pfaff, a German Federal Army Major who re-
fused to provide support to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, had his right 
to disobey upheld domestically by the German Federal Administrative Court 
on the grounds that he identiﬁed “objectively serious legal reservations” to the 
war.
278
 In neither case did the court explore the nature of the soldier’s relation-
ship to the wrong in question. However, the holdings protected the right of 
those individuals not to violate the rights of others.
279
 
C. Reparations and Participation at the ICC 
The third and ﬁnal implication of the normative account offered here goes 
to the rights of soldiers ﬁghting against aggression. Two of the ICC’s landmark 
innovations in international criminal law are that it provides crime victims the 
opportunity to participate (with legal representation) in various ways in the 
criminal proceedings and that it renders such victims eligible to receive repara-
tions following a conviction.
280
 The upshot of the account articulated in Part III 
is that, in an aggression prosecution, those participatory and reparative rights 
and privileges must attach primarily to combatants killed or injured ﬁghting an 
aggressor force and to civilians harmed in proportionate collateral damage. 
These are the constituencies whose rights the criminalization of aggression 
protects.
281
 
 
277. Al-Maisri v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1995] F.C. 642, para. 6 (Can.). 
278. BVERWG, June 21, 2005, 2 WD 12.04, http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf
/210605U2WD12.04.0.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TXT-ZMMZ]; see also Ilja Baudisch, Germany 
v. N. Decision No. 2 WD 12.04, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 911 (2006) (providing an English lan-
guage summary of the case). 
279. Cf. U.N. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, supra note 271, art. 10 (explaining that 
“no one shall be subjected to punishment or adverse action of any kind for refusing” to vio-
late human rights); supra notes 129, 131, 183 and accompanying text. 
280. On victim participation at the ICC, see Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 15(3), 43(6), 68-69; 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, No. ICC-ASP/1/3, 
Rules 85-93 (Sept. 9, 2002); and Regulations of the Court of the International Criminal 
Court, No. ICC-BD/01-01-04 , ch. 5 (May 26, 2004). These provisions have been praised as 
a “major structural achievement.” Carsten Stahn et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial 
Proceedings of the ICC, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 219, 219 (2006). On reparations, see Rome 
Statute, supra note 1, art. 75(2). See also Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court, supra, Rules 94-97; Regulations of the Court of the Court of the Inteerna-
tional Criminal Court, supra, Regulation 88. 
281. See supra notes 129, 131, 183. 
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Certain aspects of the ICC’s developing approach to deﬁning the scope of 
victims in nonaggression prosecutions are worthy of note here. In the ﬁrst deci-
sion on reparations in 2012 (following Thomas Lubanga’s conviction for child 
conscription), the Trial Chamber articulated a potentially broad standard, 
holding that the Court could issue reparations to all whose harms were proxi-
mately caused by an international crime, including both direct and indirect vic-
tims.
282
 Although affirming these points in the abstract, the Appeals Chamber 
interpreted the terms narrowly.
283
 Declining to include the full spectrum of 
persons harmed as a foreseeable consequence of the crime, it identiﬁed “direct 
victims” with reference to the rationale for the criminal prohibition—namely 
the protection of children from the fear and violence of combat and from the 
trauma of separation from family and school.
284
 On this reading, the direct vic-
tims of Lubanga’s crime were the conscripted children, and the harms relevant 
to the reparations proceedings were the physical injury, psychological trauma, 
and loss of schooling associated with that criminal wrong.
285
 In other words, 
the direct victims were those the criminal prohibition was “clearly framed to 
protect”—terminology used by the Trial Chamber in an earlier effort to follow 
Appeals Chamber guidance on the victims eligible to participate in the criminal 
proceedings.
286 
The Appeals Chamber limited “indirect victims” for the pur-
poses of both participation and reparations to those who suffered due to a 
 
282. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Establishing the Principles and 
Procedures To Be Applied to Reparations, ¶ 249 (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2012_07872.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7V2-9G69]; see also id. ¶ 180. 
283. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals Against the “De-
cision Establishing the Principles and Procedures To Be Applied to Reparations” of 7 August 
2012, ¶¶ 1, 124-129, 196-199 (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015
_02631.pdf [http://perma.cc/KDA9-DFRF] (affirming the standard, but rejecting the Trial 
Chamber’s inclusion of those subject to sexual violence as a result of child conscription). 
284. Id. ¶¶ 181, 187-91, 196-98. 
285. Id.  
286. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, Redacted Version of “Decision on ‘In-
direct Victims,’” ¶¶ 45-48, 51 (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009
_02492.pdf [http://perma.cc/5F3P-4WM5]; Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence Against Trial Chamber 
I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, ¶¶ 32, 58, 62 (July 11, 2008), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_03972.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5H6-VKJW]. 
On the speciﬁc issue of participation, rather than reparations, see Valentina Spiga, Indirect 
Victims’ Participation in the Lubanga Trial, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 183, 186-87 (2010). 
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“close personal relationship[]” to direct victims or who were harmed in the 
course of protecting direct victims.
287
 
The focus on core victims of the crime, rather than all persons foreseeably 
harmed by the crime, is probably inevitable given the wide scope of interna-
tional crimes and the limited capacity of the Court.
288
 It is also arguably more 
in line with the context of a criminal prosecution, which might be thought to 
require a focus on repairing the criminal wrong, rather than providing com-
prehensive civil compensation.
289
 
If this approach to deﬁning victims holds in the context of aggression pros-
ecutions, the implications of the traditional normative account are clear. For 
those who subscribe to that view, “the typical victim [of the crime of aggres-
sion] is a ‘state,’” and the natural implication is to accord victims’ rights and 
 
287. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals Against the “Decision Estab-
lishing the Principles and Procedures To Be Applied to Reparations” of 7 August 2012, ¶¶ 
190-191, 196-198. 
288. Victim Participation in Criminal Proceedings, supra note 13, at 25 (claiming that when subject 
to similar practical constraints, analogous domestic systems limit participation to those who 
were “the direct object of the crime (and where they are deceased, their family members)”). 
At the ICC, the solution to large numbers has been to assign common legal representation 
across many victims as a technique for managing large numbers of victim participants in the 
trial process and to provide for collective, rather than individual, reparations. Dyilo, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals Against the “Decision Establishing the 
Principles and Procedures To Be Applied to Reparations” of 7 August 2012, ¶¶ 210-215 (dis-
cussing collective reparations); see also Emily Haslam & Rod Edmunds, Common Legal Rep-
resentation at the International Criminal Court: More Symbolic than Real?, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. 
REV. 871, 883-901 (2012) (discussing the problems with the ICC’s practice of assigning 
common legal representation across many victims as a technique for managing large num-
bers). 
289. Cf. Victim Participation in Criminal Proceedings, supra note 13, at 17, 19, 23, 25 (citing domestic 
criminal justice systems that deﬁne “victims” or at least “primary victims” with standing in 
criminal proceedings as those “whose interests are protected by the prohibition of the Con-
duct,” or “who were the direct object of the crime,” especially when practical considerations 
dictate that focus). On the importance of deﬁning ICC reparations with reference to the 
criminal context, see Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals Against 
the “Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures To Be Applied to Reparations” of 7 
August 2012, ¶ 65. See also DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 237 (2d ed. 2005); Andreas O’Shea, Reparations Under International Criminal Law, in 
REPAIRING THE PAST? INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON REPARATIONS FOR GROSS HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES 179, 189 (Max du Plessis & Stephen Peté eds., 2007). On the expressive role 
of reparations, see Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals Against the 
“Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures To Be Applied to Reparations” of 7 
August 2012, ¶¶ 70, 202; and CONOR MCCARTHY, REPARATIONS AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 61-62, 133, 188 (2012). 
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privileges to state representatives, with the ICC channeling reparations to the 
attacked state following a conviction.
290
 
On the unjustiﬁed killing account, this would be a mistake. The state is not 
the person (and its sovereignty is not the value) that the criminalization of ag-
gression was “clearly framed to protect.” The criminalization of aggression pro-
tects combatants’ and collateral civilians’ right to life.
291
 The harm by virtue of 
which aggression is criminally wrongful is that inﬂicted through unjustiﬁed vi-
olence against human beings. 
Seen in that light, those granted participatory rights and privileges in ag-
gression prosecutions must be combatants who fought against aggression and 
civilians harmed as collateral damage, probably as two or more broad classes 
with collective representation.
292
 Reparations should focus on the same groups, 
funding veterans’ care or reintegration programs, assisting the families of dead 
soldiers and collaterally harmed civilians, and otherwise acknowledging the 
true wrong at the heart of the crime.
293
 
In addition to diverging radically from a state-focused participation and 
reparations regime at the ICC, this upshot also stands in stark contrast to re-
cent jus ad bellum reparations regimes in the compensation commission con-
text. Consider here the U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC), set up after 
Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission 
(EECC), set up following Eritrea’s armed attack on Ethiopia at the turn of the 
millennium. Both commissions issued a wide array of awards relating to the 
losses suffered by Kuwaiti and Ethiopian businesses and civilians as a result of 
 
290. Stahn, supra note 41, at 877, 880-81. For additional authors taking a similar stance, see HANS 
DAS & HANS VAN HOUTTE, 1 POST-WAR RESTORATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 238 (2008); MCDOUGALL, supra note 140, at 293. To be clear, accepting the 
traditional account and recognizing this to be its logical implication does not entail thinking 
this is a good idea. Thus, Stahn writes of his own observation that this may “run against the 
purpose and mandate of the court.” Stahn, supra note 41, at 881. In some ways, this is a more 
speciﬁc form of Luban’s broader position. See supra Section II.B. For other suggestions that 
the “victims” of aggression are states, see MCCARTHY, supra note 289, at 293; WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 324-25 (2007); and 
Aurel Sari, The Status of Foreign Armed Forces Deployed in Post-Conﬂict Environments: A Search 
for Basic Principles, in JUS POST BELLUM, supra note 41, at 467, 483 (claiming that the “demise 
of the concept of punishment for aggression” after the post-World War II prosecutions and 
the “humanization of reparations” are part of the same normative trajectory). 
291. See supra notes 129, 131, 183 and accompanying text. 
292. On participation as a class with a common legal representative, see supra note 288. 
293. Rehabilitation is a core reparative modality at the ICC. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 
75. 
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the respective wars.
294
 Among the many claims deemed eligible by the more 
expansive UNCC were traffic accidents that occurred due to the general break-
down of civil order in Kuwait, individual and corporate property losses caused 
by that breakdown,
 
and losses caused when the continuation of contracts be-
came impossible for one or more of the parties due to the conﬂict.
295
 However, 
despite their generally broad approaches to deﬁning eligible victims, both 
commissions excluded almost all harms suffered by combatants ﬁghting against 
the aggressor force, other than those caused by jus in bello violations.
296
 
As indicated above, that a compensation commission would take a broader 
reparative approach than a criminal court is quite appropriate. However, in 
light of what is most fundamentally wrong with aggressive war from the inter-
nal point of view, the marginalization of soldiers’ deaths and suffering was a 
grave mistake that the International Criminal Court must not replicate. To-
gether with collaterally harmed civilians, those combatants should in fact be at 
the very heart of participatory and reparative rights at the ICC. 
 
294. For the details of the UNCC’s work, see Reports and Recommendations of the Panels of Com-
missioners, UNITED NATIONS COMP. COMMISSION, http://www.uncc.ch/reports-and-rec
ommendations-panels-commissioners [http://perma.cc/DK5W-FJDE]. For the more lim-
ited work of the EECC on jus ad bellum claims, see Ethiopia’s Damages Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 
26 R.I.A.A. 631, 716-68 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2009). 
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These three implications—clarifying the marginal status of humanitarian 
intervention and bloodless aggression, the soldier’s right not to ﬁght in an ille-
gal war, and the centrality of combatant death and suffering to victim status 
and reparations at the ICC—are only sketched in introductory form here. 
Plainly, each demands more detailed elaboration and consideration. However, 
this sketch illustrates why deﬁning the normative core of aggression matters 
doctrinally. With the Court poised to take jurisdiction over the crime, clarity on 
these issues is a matter of urgency. 
 
conclusion 
This Article has debunked a common misconception—that aggression is a 
normative anomaly in international criminal law, uniquely rooted in a wrong 
inﬂicted on the attacked state, rather than in an accumulation of wrongs inﬂict-
ed on individual human beings. Not only are individuals wronged gravely in an 
aggressive war, the wrongfulness of their treatment as individuals is at the very 
crux of what explains the criminalization of such wars. For ﬁve reasons, wrong-
ful killing—and not aggression’s typical infringement of sovereignty—is the 
normative core of the crime. 
First, sovereignty is indeterminate as a normative guide on the issue of ag-
gression. The criminalization of such wars is at least as great a restraint on state 
sovereignty as it is a protection of it. Moreover, other sovereignty violations 
that more effectively and dramatically infringe the core sovereign rights of ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence, or the collective right of self-
determination, are not criminalized. Second, what distinguishes aggression 
from other sovereignty violations is that it involves unjustiﬁed, direct attacks 
on the lives and physical integrity of human beings. Indeed, some criminal 
wars involve the inﬂiction of unjustiﬁed death and human suffering without 
infringing sovereign rights at all. And, crucially, if aggression were not a crime, 
it would be the anomalous context in which unjustiﬁed killings were noncrim-
inal. Third, understanding aggression in this way reconciles it to the broader 
moral project of international criminal law—namely, the protection of individ-
uals and groups from the most egregious violations of their rights and dignity. 
Fourth, the claimed imperative to incorporate a restrictive jus ad bellum into 
twentieth century international law was articulated not in terms of sovereignty, 
but in terms of humanity. Finally, the reasoning of the judges and prosecutors 
at Nuremberg and Tokyo reveals a shared understanding that the prohibition 
of wrongful killing is the normative core of the crime. 
For all of these reasons, the account of aggression advanced here better ex-
plains the contours of the crime, comports more closely with the purposes of 
international criminal law, and better aligns with adjacent areas of international 
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law. Recognizing this ought to inform how we interpret the criminal law status 
of bloodless invasions and humanitarian intervention, how we understand the 
claims of soldiers who refuse to ﬁght in criminal wars, and how we deﬁne the 
expressive focus of victim participation and reparations in ICC aggression 
prosecutions. 
